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 This document examines the effects on CARICOM countries of changes in the EU 
import regimes for banana, rice and sugar. Changes have been pursued by the EU since the 
formation of the Single Market in 1992 and were determined by both internal and external 
factors - cost to the EU budget and WTO requirements, respectively. Changes were made to 
tariff quotas affecting mainly non ACP exports of bananas to the EU market; reduction in the 
price of sugar in the EU market and reduction in both price and tariffs in the EU rice market. 
CARICOM banana exporters were the most affected by regime change given the small size of 
their banana operations and the high cost of production. The EU has been providing support for 
banana and sugar producing countries to improve competitiveness or diversify into other areas of 
production. It is argued that some CARICOM countries would find it very difficult to improve 
competitiveness given their small scale of production and relatively high cost of labour. 
However, the alternative of diversifying out of the traditional industries is not an effective 
solution in light of the role the industries play in sustaining livelihoods of rural communities as 
well as the culture of specific countries. Efforts at diversifying into alternative crops have not 
proved successful over the longer term. Instead, it is proposed that restructuring the traditional 
industries to produce for export niche markets as well as to produce value added products for 
domestic and regional markets would sustain the industries and address the twin concerns of 











 Trade relations between countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as part of 
an African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group and countries of the European Union (EU) – 
formerly European Community – were formalized in a series of conventions beginning with the 
Lomé I Convention in 1975. CARICOM countries (and other ACP countries) were granted non-
reciprocal preferential access to the markets of the EU. Although tariff reductions were granted 
on agricultural and industrial imports from ACP countries, they did not apply to those products 
subject to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. As a result commodity protocols 
were introduced for banana, sugar, rum and beef and veal. Under these protocols beneficiary 
countries were allowed annual tariff-free quotas of exports at guaranteed and higher than world 
market prices.  
 
 This study examines the effects of changes in the EU import regime for two of the 
products covered by the commodity protocols, banana and sugar. Although rice is not covered by 
a protocol it is a significant agricultural export for two CARICOM countries. As such, changes 
in the EU import regime for this product would have significant implications for those countries 
as well as for the CARICOM region as a whole. Rice is therefore the third commodity that is 
examined in terms of the impact of changes in the EU regime. 
 
 Analyses have been done of the implications of changes in some of the commodity 
regimes – mainly sugar and banana. These have tended to be general in terms of ACP countries 
as a whole or with focus on specific industries. The advice proffered by some analysts and 
international agencies is diversification out of the traditional industries and into alternative 
export industries such as tourism, information technology and cultural and professional services. 
Although CARICOM countries have been developing alternative export industries over the years 
the traditional agricultural industries have remained important for a number of reasons. 
 
A. Importance of sugar, banana and rice to CARICOM economies 
 
 Agriculture and, specifically, sugar has been the bedrock of the economies of Caribbean 
countries. Dependence on the sugar industry grew out of the colonial relations between the 
countries in the region and specific European countries, namely the United Kingdom, France, 
Netherlands and Spain. The latter promoted the production of sugar in the region to satisfy 
demand and facilitate industrial development in Europe. However, by the turn of the twentieth  
century beet sugar production became established in Europe.  
 
 Sugar cane was the main source of sugar until about the mid-eighteenth century when 
producing sugar from the sugar beet was discovered by a German scientist and the first beet 
sugar factory was built in Germany in 1799. France began growing beet and producing beet 
sugar in the early nineteenth century largely as a result of the Napoleonic wars and British 
blockage of French ports in 1811 which prevented France from importing sugar from its 
colonies. The success of France in producing sugar led other European countries to develop 
production of sugar from beet. The sugar industry in the United Kingdom was not established 





continent and in the United Kingdom meant that the countries in Europe were able to reduce 
their dependence on sugar imports from their former colonies in the Caribbean. 
 
 Although European countries had moved into the production of sugar, those with 
colonies maintained preferential access for sugar exports from those colonies. British colonies in 
the Caribbean exported their sugar to the United Kingdom initially under the British Imperial 
Preference of 1919 and subsequently under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement of 1951. 
African and Malagasy States had preferential access for their sugar to the European Economic 
Community (EEC) under the Yaoundé Convention of 1963. When the United Kingdom joined 
the European Community in 1972 negotiations were undertaken which eventually resulted in the 
first Lomé Convention of 1975 between the European Community and ACP countries. The 
Lomé Convention of 1975 (and subsequent conventions) replaced the different preferential 
arrangements that previously existed.  Preferential access and guaranteed prices for Caribbean 
sugar were important for countries in the region as their sugar industry had been declining since 
its heyday during the colonial period of slavery. 
 
 The countries of the eastern Caribbean – the Windward and Leeward Islands1 – moved 
out of the production of sugar on account of the significant decline of the industry during the 
nineteenth century. Banana became the main commodity that replaced sugar. Cultivation of the 
crop began in the early twentieth century with the first shipment of bananas to New York from 
Saint Lucia in 1925. However, the banana trade did not develop on account of banana disease 
and the onset of the Second World War. It was resuscitated after the war and developed with the 
encouragement of the British Government. Jamaica became a major producer and exporter of 
bananas since the industry started in the late nineteenth century based on the initiative of an 
American trader and encouraged by the United Kingdom which became the main market for the 
country’s banana exports.  
 
 Although countries diversified into other industries in particular tourism and extractive 
industries in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, sugar and bananas continued to play a 
significant role in the economies of Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica in the case of sugar and 
Jamaica and the Windward Islands in the case of bananas. Trade preferences from the EU under 
the commodity protocols annexed to the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements have therefore been 
important for sustaining the countries that depended on those industries.  
 
 Although the monetary contribution of sugar to output was significant in all countries and 
especially in Guyana and Jamaica, the percentage contribution was most significant in Guyana. 
Guyana also accounted for the highest percentage contribution to export earnings. In the case of 
employment Belize followed by Guyana accounted for the highest contribution. Barbados is the 
country where sugar had the greatest contribution to indirect employment (table 1).  
 
                                                     




















Barbados 24.7 1.1 2.3 1.8 4.2 
Belize 17.1 2.5 4.9 12.5 1.2 
Guyana 61.3 10.1 11.4 7.2 2.4 
Jamaica 53.2 0.8 1.8 2.4 1.1 
Trinidad &Tobago 20.1 0.3 0.5 4.2 1.9 
  Source: Adapted from table 3 (based on a LMC study of 2004) in Stephen Thornhill, “Safeguarding 
  The Benefits of the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol in the Context of the EPA Negotiations, 28/02/07 
 
 
 Whereas the dependence on sugar was significant for most of the sugar producing 
countries in the region, in the case of Guyana the dependence on sugar was by far greater than in 
the other countries. In the case of bananas it is the Windward Islands with the exception of 
Grenada that are most dependent on banana exports. The banana industry is also significant for 
Belize (table 2). 
 
Table 2 























Belize 14.7 7.4 3.2 2.3 
Jamaica 1.9 0.7 0.3 0.1 
Suriname 3.4 2.9 2.1 0.8 
Windward Islands 29.6 6.2 3.2 8.0 
Dominica 23.0 8.3 4.4 9.9 
Grenada 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 
Saint Lucia 39.5 6.3 3.6 10.8 
St. Vincent/Grenadines 39.3 10.1 5.0 8.4 
 Source: Table 7.3 in NERA “Addressing the Impact of Preference Erosion in Bananas on Caribbean 
 Countries: A Report for DFID”, London August 2004 
 Although the Caribbean rice trade with Europe is not covered by any commodity 
protocol, Caribbean producers, mainly Guyana and Suriname, depend significantly on EU 
preferences. The cultivation of rice was actually introduced into the Caribbean by the Dutch in 
the early eighteenth century. However, the rice industry did not really develop for example in 
Guyana until the late nineteenth century when Indian immigrants who had a culture of rice 
farming began cultivating the grain. The industry has since grown into a significant source of 





largest world exporter of rice. The contribution of the industry to agricultural GDP is about 20 
per cent and to export earnings about 12 per cent. More than 12,000 farmers are supported by the 
industry as well as about 20 per cent of the population of the country. 
 The industries that form the focus of this analysis are important not only because of their 
overall contribution to economic output, employment and foreign exchange earnings but also 
because of their contribution to the livelihood of people in communities around which the 
industries developed. Sugar has been the most significant in terms of its social contribution to 
workers as well as their communities. The sugar industry has contributed to improvement of 
roads (construction and maintenance); supply of water (tanks and water trucks), health care 
(clinics); education through school infrastructure, bursaries and skills training; agriculture 
through extension service; and the development of sports through sponsorship and infrastructure. 
 
Unless diversification out of those industries can contribute toward sustaining and 
improving rural communities then countries would experience increased rural to urban migration 
with adverse effects on rural development. The choice should not have to be between retaining 
the traditional industries and developing alternative industries. The case was made in a previous 
study for diversification within the traditional industries which would not only create jobs but 
create high skilled jobs as well as value added products.2  
 
B. Scope and methodology 
 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the impact on selected CARICOM countries of 
changes in the EU regime affecting ‘protocol’ commodities, banana and sugar, using indicators 
such as production, exports, earnings and employment. Rice was also included since it is a major 
export of Guyana and has also been affected by change in the EU import regime. The countries 
selected are those that are the main producers of the commodities being examined, namely 
Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and the Windward Islands.  
  
 The study relied on data gathering from a variety of sources including FAOSTAT, the 
European Union and recent studies on the changes in the EU banana and sugar regimes. 
Resource constraints precluded field visits to evaluate strategies for meeting the challenge of 
preference erosion in the industries under review. Some of the strategies were reported in a 
previous study3 but could not be evaluated since they were in early stages of formulation and 
implementation. 
 
 The next section examines the factors that influenced changes in the EU import regimes 
in order to determine implications for the future. Changes in the import regimes for bananas, 
sugar and rice are then examined. In the section following the review of each regime change a 
number of options are considered for the different industries as well as for specific countries. The 
conclusion points to the need for further work at the industry and country level in order to make 
appropriate proposals for adaptation to changing trade relations between CARICOM countries 
and their traditional trade partners.  
                                                     
2 See ECLAC, Restructuring Caribbean Industries to Meet the Challenge of Trade Liberalisation, Limited 
LC/CAR/L.77, 21 December 2005 






II. Factors influencing EU regime change 
 
 A number of factors were responsible for the process of reform to its agricultural policy 
that the EU embarked on from 1992. Production surpluses, increased budgetary costs, expansion 
of the EU and compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements all determined 
the changes that have been made to the EU agricultural regimes. 
 
 The CAP of the EU was devised to guide the implementation of the European Common 
Market consequent upon the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that created the European 
Community. It became effective from 1962 and was geared toward increasing food self  
sufficiency while improving the living standards of agricultural communities and ensuring 
reasonable prices for agricultural products. Self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs was a critical 
objective based on the food shortages resulting from the effects of World War II. 
 
 The CAP mechanisms were subsidies and guaranteed prices to farmers, investment grants 
for restructuring agriculture and common market preference (protection) through tariff barriers to 
imports. The products that benefited most from the CAP and for which the EU a became net 
exporter as a result were cereals, dairy products, beef and veal and sugar.  
 
 The very success of the CAP in achieving self sufficiency in a number of agricultural 
products has been an important factor in the reforms that have been pursued since the early 
1990s4. The incentives to farmers to produce resulted in significant production levels from the 
1960s and constant surpluses of products, especially beef and cereals that had to be stored or 
exported at high cost to both the EU budget and world market prices so as not to depress internal 
farm gate prices. EU exports to the world market had to be subsidized so that farmers did not 
receive less than the EU internal prices for the commodities. This of course had the effect of 
depressing world market prices for the said commodities and therefore the prices received by 
non-EU exporters to the world market.  
 
 The significant increases in storage (intervention stocks) and export refunds resulted in 
high budget cost5 and hence put pressure on member countries’ contributions to the EU budget 
especially in light of the unpopularity of these measures with consumers and taxpayers in EU 
countries. Minor reforms were adopted such as quotas to reduce the production of milk, for 
example. The EU also increased member countries’ budget contributions from 1 per cent to 1.2 
per cent of the EU GDP by 1992.6  
 
 Major reform of the CAP began in 1992 when regional integration deepened into the EU. 
There was a move away from incentives for increased production towards a system of direct 
payments to farmers. Support prices were reduced on products such as cereals, pulses and beef. 
The price reduction was offset by compensation payments linked to annual reduction in arable 
                                                     
4 The EU achieved self-sufficiency in sugar by the late 1970s and in cereals and beef by the beginning of the 1980s 
[based on data from European Commission Eurostat]. 
5 Agriculture expenditure was more than two thirds of the total EU budget during the early 1980s. 
6 Ivan Roberts and Caroline Gunning-Trant, “The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy: A Stocktake of 





crop acreage. The second major reform in 1999 saw intervention prices for cereals, arable crops 
and beef reduced and compensation payments to farmers increased. These measures facilitated 
reduction in surpluses. At the same time emphasis was placed on environmental sustainability of 
farming which had been a growing concern in the EU. The farmer’s role was defined in terms of 
maintenance of the countryside and protection of the environment. 
 
 The third major reform to the CAP was in 2003. Single farm payments to farmers were 
decoupled from production and linked instead to promoting the environment as well as food 
safety and animal welfare standards. Intervention prices were reduced for rice, wheat, butter and 
skim milk powder. The sugar regime which had not been affected by the 1992-2003 changes 
became the target of reform in 2005 when the intervention price was significantly reduced to be 
implemented over the period from 2006 to 2010.  
 
 The expansion of the EU was an important factor in the reform of the CAP. There were 
only six members during the initial phase of the CAP up to 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom were added to the Union. By 1986 the EU membership doubled from the pre-
1973 period to 12 with the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain. So that at the start of major 
reforms in 1992 the EU had expanded significantly which made it necessary to address the 
problem of increased budgetary expenditure. The expansion of membership continued from 12 in 
1986 to 25 in 2004, and with the addition of Bulgaria and Romania would result in a total of 27 
EU members in 2007. Budgetary problems would continue unless the EU continues to 
implement significant reforms to the CAP.7 
 
 The reforms pursued by the EU have been directly related to the Uruguay Round 
Agreement of 1994. In that agreement, countries had agreed to convert all non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) to tariff equivalents and bind them along with all other tariffs. All tariffs were to be 
reduced by 36 per cent equally distributed over the six-year period from 1994. Domestic support 
policies were considered to be trade distorting. Agreement was therefore reached to reduce 
domestic support to agriculture by 20 per cent by 2000 for developed countries including 
members of the EU. Export subsidy is the other key area in which reduction commitment was 
agreed in the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture. Developed countries were required to reduce 
expenditure on export subsides by 36 per cent and the actual amount of exports they subsidized 
by 21 per cent for each subsidized product over the six-year period from the signing of the 
agreement. 
 
 Domestic support, export subsidies and tariffs are integrally related in the EU CAP and 
commodity regimes. The EU objectives were essentially to develop self sufficiency in a number 
of agricultural products and to ensure a relatively high standard of living for the farmers in 
member countries. Domestic support provided the incentive in terms of high prices to farmers. 
High tariffs were necessary to protect farmers’ income from lower cost imports. Export subsidies 
performed a similar function, that is, ensuring that farmers did not receive the lower prices that 
existed on the world market. They were also necessary to allow EU agricultural exports to 
compete on the world market. 
 
                                                     





 Despite EU tariff cuts the level of tariffs remained high. This was largely due to the 
period (1986-1988) used as the base from which bound tariffs would be cut: a period when world 
market prices were low and EU tariff equivalents were high. This allowed the EU to meet the 
WTO tariff reduction commitment while still maintaining relatively high tariffs.8 Although 
domestic support in respect of market prices was reduced by 25 per cent from the first significant 
reform in 1992 to 2005, the shift from price support to income support through direct payments 
to farmers did not significantly change the overall level of support to agriculture. 
 
 The EU has the highest level of export subsidies although these have been significantly 
reduced since 1992. Export subsidies in relation to sugar are the main ones of interest to 
Caribbean countries especially since the reforms to the EU sugar regime have been influenced by 
the challenge to the EU sugar subsidies by Australia, Brazil and Thailand. The complainants 
argued that the EU was providing export subsidies to sugar that were greater than the levels 
committed under the WTO. 9 The WTO Panel ruled in 2004 in favour of the challengers. What 
the ruling means is that the EU would have to reduce both the quantity of sugar exports and the 
export subsidy expenditure.  
  
 Changes in the EU policy in agriculture as well as in the specific commodity regimes will 
affect countries that export those commodities. The effect may be positive for exporters that have 
had to rely on lower world market prices because of the high barriers to EU markets but negative 
for exporters that have relied on preferential access and higher prices in the EU markets. The 
next section looks at the experiences of Caribbean countries in respect of bananas, sugar and rice 
and exports to the EU market. 
 
                                                     
8 See reference 3 for a good discussion on the EU tariffication to meet WTO requirements. 
9 The “undeclared subsidized exports” were exports equal to the amount of sugar imported from the ACP and India 
plus the EU sugar referred to as “C” quota sugar in the EU sugar regime. The latter is surplus sugar that the EU must 
export without subsidies but since it is exported below cost that is equivalent to an export subsidy under the WTO. 





III. Changes in the EU banana regime and the effect  
on Caribbean economies 
 
A. The banana regime 
 
 Although the EU regimes covered a number of crops, the ones of relevance to Caribbean 
countries are those that provided preferential access to the EU markets, namely banana, rice and 
sugar. Most of the changes to those regimes began with the formation of the European Single 
Market in 1992. In the case of bananas, different import regimes existed before the change to a 
common EU regime in 1993.  
 
 The origins of the EU banana import regime are important for understanding the changes 
that took place subsequent to the establishment of the EU in 1992 and which significantly 
affected the banana producing countries of the Caribbean. The regime was the result of the 
attempt by the EU to liberalise the movement of goods within the EU market and harmonise 
member countries’ external trade by introducing a common external tariff for EU imports from 
third countries.  
 
 Prior to the 1993 regime, each European country had its own banana regime based on 
historical relationships with former colonies and other special trade interests. Three different 
regimes were in operation. Former colonies, including Caribbean countries, were granted duty 
free access to the markets of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece and 
were protected by a 20 per cent tariff imposed on banana imports from Latin American countries 
and by quotas imposed by the United Kingdom, France and Spain. The Benelux countries – 
Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg -, Denmark and Ireland imposed a general 20 per cent 
tariff on all banana imports. Germany, on the other hand, provided tariff free quota access to 
banana imports from Latin America.  
 
 Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome allowed the EU member States to retain their specific 
import regimes. A special ‘Banana Protocol’ attached to the Treaty of Rome guaranteed 
Germany its access to bananas based on its tariff free quota regime. Unification of the EU 
banana market was approved in 1992 and the new banana regime continued the duty free access 
of ACP bananas but under a quota of up to the 1990 level of ACP imports into the EU. Dollar 
bananas as well as non-traditional ACP bananas were subject to a quota of 2 million tonnes and a 
fixed tariff of €100 per tonne.10  
 
 Latin American countries were against the provisions of the new regime. Germany, 
Denmark and Portugal were also opposed to it and hence voted against the regime. Some 
concessions were made such as regular adjustment of the quota but these did not appease those 
opposed to the regime. The regulation for bringing the regime into effect was passed only with 
the support of Denmark which held the presidency of the EU at the time and therefore felt 
obliged to defend the integrity of its procedures. Nevertheless, it was subject to dispute given the 
hostile reaction of Latin American banana producers and a minority of EU countries, in 
                                                     
10 The ad valorem equivalent of this tariff was higher (21 per cent based on 1991 figures or 24 per cent based on 
1992 figures) than the pre-1992 tariff of 20 per cent. See Robert Read (2001), “The Anatomy of the EU-US WTO 





particular Germany which was significantly affected by the end of its cheaper banana policy. 
Germany was the highest consumer of bananas most of which were imported from Latin 
American countries and had the lowest prices in Europe. Germany deepened its opposition by 
challenging the new regime in the European Court of Justice but was defeated when the Court 
disallowed it.11 Challenges against the regime continued at the levels of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO. 
 
 A successful challenge in 1993 under GATT by some Latin American producers to the 
quota and tariff restrictions on dollar bananas led to adjustment of the regime for bananas in 
1995. The tariff quota for dollar bananas and ACP bananas that exceeded their traditional level 
was increased to 2.2 million tonnes and the in-quota tariff was reduced to €75 per tonne. The ad 
valorem tariff equivalent was 20 per cent for Latin American countries that signed a framework 
agreement with the EU, namely Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela. For countries 
that did not sign the agreement the ad valorem equivalent tariff was 30 per cent. Traditional ACP 
suppliers maintained their preferential tariff-free access within a quota of 857,000 tonnes.  
 
 Based on complaints from the United States marketing company, Chiquita, that the 
licensing system restricted its entry into the EU market, the United States along with Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico requested in 1996 a WTO Dispute Panel to rule on the EU 
banana regime violation of WTO agreements, including the agreement on licensing procedures. 
The Panel found that the EU regime had violated WTO commitments regarding the use of tariff 
quotas and the allocation of import licences.12  
 
 The EU made changes to the banana regime in 1999 in response to the ruling of the 
WTO.  The licensing system was replaced by one based on past importation using 1994-1996 as 
the base year; and country-specific allocations of the ACP quota were abolished. However, 
dissatisfaction with the tariff quotas led Ecuador to challenge the legality of the EU regime 
changes. The EU was again ruled by an arbitration panel to be non-compliant with WTO rules. 
That ruling and the trade sanctions imposed by the WTO led to a new two-phase banana regime 
in 2001.  
 
 From 2001 to 2005 three tariff quotas would regulate banana imports into the EU: a 
850,000 tonnes quota (‘C’ quota) at a tariff rate of €300, the existing 2.2 million tonnes quota 
(‘A’ quota) at a tariff rate of €75 which had been allocated to dollar bananas and an additional 
353,000 tonnes (‘B’ quota) at the same rate of €75 per tonne to cater for EU expansion in 1995. 
These quotas were open to banana imports from all sources, but imports from ACP countries 
would be tariff-free. In the second phase from the beginning of 2002 the C quota which was a de 
facto ACP quota was formally reserved for the ACP. But 100,000 tonnes of that quota was 
transferred to the B quota. The tariff quotas were to be allocated on a first-come first-served 
basis. 
 
                                                     
11 See Paul Sutton, “The Banana Regime of the European Union, the Caribbean, and Latin America”, Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.39, No.2 (Summer 1997), pp.5-36 and Karen J. Alter and Sophie 
Meunier, “Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute”, Journal of European 
Public Policy 13:3 April 2006: 362-382 for discussion of the origin and dispute surrounding the EU banana regime 





 Before the end of the three-tiered tariff-quota system the EU announced a proposed flat-
rate tariff of €230 per tonne which was rejected by Latin American producers and the WTO. A 
reduction to €187 was also rejected. At the end of 2005 the EU further reduced the tariff rate to 
€176 which came into effect from the beginning of 2006.  
 
B. Effects of changes in banana regime 
 
 The effect of these changes on Caribbean economies can be seen in terms of the 
production and export of bananas over the years. The single market banana regime of 1993 
resulted in a decline in banana exports in 1994. The decline was particularly significant for the 
Windward Islands. The adjusted regime from 1995 had an even more significant effect on 
traditional Caribbean banana exports which continued their downward trend. The cessation of 
ACP country allocations in 1999 resulted in a more dramatic decline of banana exports from the 
Windward Islands and Jamaica (see figure 1). They however benefited non-traditional suppliers 
such as Belize and the Dominican Republic which were able to significantly increase their 
exports. Belize’s annual average growth of banana exports to the EU between 1995 and 2005 
was 7 per cent whereas that of the Dominican Republic was 8.5 per cent. 
 
 West African suppliers, namely Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire which are the main 
exporters of African ACP countries also significantly increased their exports13. In 2005 banana 
exports from African ACP countries represented 58 per cent of total ACP exports to the EU 
whereas Caribbean ACP countries accounted for 42 per cent. On the other hand exports from 
CARICOM ACP countries (excluding the Dominican Republic) were only 23 per cent of total 
ACP exports. Prior to the EU single market regime Caribbean exports accounted for over half of 
ACP exports to the EU. The distribution of EU banana imports from the main suppliers in 2005 
is shown in figure 2.  
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Figure 2: EU 25 Banana Imports from Main Suppliers 2005 
 
 
Source: Based on EUROSTAT 
 
 
 Latin American exporters also took advantage of the changes made to the EU regime in 
the 2001-2005 period. The EU now imports bananas mainly from Latin American countries. In 
1995 the main “dollar banana” countries – Colombia, Costa Rica and Ecuador – accounted for 45 
per cent of total EU banana imports. By 2005 this amount increased to 68 per cent.  
 
 During the first year (first eight months) of the tariff-only regime (2006), Latin American 
exports grew by about 11 per cent although Ecuador, which is the main Latin American exporter 
to the EU, saw its exports decline by 4 per cent. On the other hand ACP exports grew by about 
19 per cent with the most significant growth from Ghana and Jamaica.14 Nevertheless, it is the 
non-traditional ACP exporters – Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire – that remained the main ACP 
exporters to the EU in 2006. 
 
 Banana production in the Caribbean reflected more or less the declining trend in banana 
exports since the first EU regime change in 1993. This was specifically the case in respect of 
Jamaica and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) countries although the 
declining trend in St. Vincent and the Grenadines was reversed from 1998 (figure 3). By contrast 
Belize and the Dominican Republic maintained their production trend although both countries 
significantly increased their production from 2001 in the case of the Dominican Republic and 
from 2003 in the case of Belize (figure 4). 
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Source: Based on FAOSTAT 
 
 
 The decline in banana production and export has had a significant impact on employment 
in the banana industry in the Windward Islands of the OECS. Available data point to a decline in 
the number of farmers from 27,000 in 1992 to 5,000 in 2003. However, this does not take into 
account the overall number of banana workers who depended on income from the banana 
industry. It was suggested that the total decline in employment could be as high as 67,00015. 
Dominica, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are the most dependent on the 
industry whereas banana production has practically ceased in Grenada (figure 3). 
 
C. Future changes in EU – ACP banana relations 
 
 The challenges to the EU banana regime and new trade agreements between the EU and 
different groups of countries, including those of the ACP, will have further impact on ACP 
CARICOM exporters. The challenge by Ecuador in November 2006 to the EU tariff regime of 
2006 was intensified by mid-2007 when the United States16 joined the challenge mounted by 
Ecuador. The United States concern was the discriminatory tariff imposed’ on “dollar banana” 
                                                     
15 Ian Gillson et al. “Forthcoming Changes in the EU Banana/Sugar Markets: A Menu of Options for an Effective 
EU Transitional Package”. UK, Overseas Development Institute 
16 The US is the home base of Chiquita, Del Monte and Dole, three of the largest multinational companies with 





exports compared to the duty free quota reserved for ACP exports. Ecuador’s concern was the 
loss of its market share in the EU market which, it claimed, declined from 30 per cent during the 
first eight months of 2005 to 27 per cent in the corresponding period of 2006. Nevertheless, as 
the EU argued, Latin American banana exports to the EU increased by 11 per cent in 2006 and 
by 8 per cent during the first eight months of 2007. 
 
 In November 2007 the WTO ruled (subject to appeal) in favour of Ecuador that the EU 
banana import regime violated global trade rules. In the event of the EU appealing and losing a 
case against the WTO finding it will have to revisit its tariff system and most likely reduce the 
tariff imposed on non-ACP banana exporters. However, reciprocal and free trade agreements 
with groups of ACP countries would change the trade relations between the EU and those 
countries and their discriminatory tariff-free quota access to the EU banana market.  
 
 The EU and the CARIFORUM group of ACP countries – CARICOM plus the 
Dominican Republic – reached agreement before the end of 2007 for an Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA), which would free substantially all trade between the two groups of countries. 
This means that Caribbean countries will no longer receive non-reciprocal preferences for their 
exports to EU markets. When the agreement comes into effect Caribbean countries (as members 
of CARIFORUM) will receive tariff-free and quota-free access for bananas into the EU and this 
preference will be “protected under the WTO rules governing free trade areas”17. The WTO 
ruling against the EU banana preferences will therefore no longer be valid in respect of 
CARIFORUM banana exporters.  
 
 Caribbean banana preference within an EU-CARIFORUM free trade area could however 
be eroded if the EU concludes, as expected, free-trade arrangements with Latin American 
countries – the Andean group and the Central American group. Even with the relatively high EU 
tariff on Latin American bananas Caribbean exporters have had difficulty in maintaining their 
share of the EU market. But of equal or greater significance to Caribbean exporters is the 
conclusion of an EPA between the EU and West African countries some of which have become 
competitive banana exporters and could increase their share of the EU banana market at the 
expense of Caribbean exporters.  
 
 The most significant impact will be in terms of the earnings that Caribbean exporters will 
receive given the changes that have been made to the EU banana import regime. Prices in the EU 
market declined by 20 per cent in 2006 due to increase in both ACP and Latin American imports 
into the EU. By the end of 2006 prices were 10 per cent below 2005 price levels.18 Increased 
imports as a result of tariff-free and quota-free access to the EU market under EPAs with groups 
of ACP countries will have an adverse impact on prices in the EU banana market. The EU had 
anticipated the decline in prices due to changes in its import regime and therefore proposed 
changes to its support for EU banana growers in line with changes in support of other commodity 
producers under the CAP of the EU.  
 
 The decline in prices will have an adverse effect on the ability of CARICOM banana 
producers to compete with both Latin American producers and other ACP producers. This is due 
                                                     
17 Accessed at the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery website: www.crnm.org/rnm updates.htm 





largely to the high cost of production in CARICOM countries. Comparison of banana producer 
prices in the various banana producing countries is made difficult largely because of the lack of 
price data for some countries as well as the unreliability of some of the available data. However, 
some insight can be gleaned from banana export unit values as shown in figure 5. The highest 
cost exporters are the CARICOM exporters whereas the lowest cost exporters are the Latin 
American exporters and Dominican Republic which is a non-CARICOM ACP exporter. Of 
significance are the increasing cost trend of the OECS countries and the decreasing trend in 
Jamaica. Despite the relatively low prices in Belize and the Dominican Republic the trend has 
tended upwards since 2003.   
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IV. Options for Caribbean banana producers 
 
A. Industry expansion 
 
This option of expanding the industry by improving competitiveness may not be feasible 
for most Caribbean Countries in light of the decline in banana prices and the high cost of 
production in those countries. The EU has been providing support to improve the 
competitiveness of the banana industry in Caribbean countries where this is feasible. Improving 
competitiveness really means reducing costs in order to compete on the basis of price. Since one 
of the main cost components is labour cost and reduction of wages is not a viable option in the 
Caribbean then substitution of labour would have to be considered. However, mechanized 
production requires large areas of flat land such as the estates in Latin American countries. 
Belize and Suriname (and possibly Jamaica) may be able to expand production and reduce costs 
to take advantage of the tariff and quota free access to the EU market under the EPA. 
 
Suriname may be the country most likely to succeed in expanding production and 
reducing cost to take advantage of the new market access. It has pursued restructuring of the 
industry with support from the EU since early 2000. The State-owned sole banana producer had 
collapsed in 2001. Privatisation which is considered to be the key to ensuring the sustainability 
of the industry is being pursued through, among other things, improving the competitiveness of 
the new State-owned company. Prior to the collapse banana production in Suriname had reached 
almost 60,000 tonnes in 1999 (figure 6). Since the collapse in 2001 production increased to about 
20,000 tonnes in 2005 and more than doubled in 2006 to 46,500 tonnes. Production was 
estimated at 60,000 tonnes in 2007 and projected to 70,000 tonnes in 2008.19 The industry was 
able not only to significantly increase production but also to reduce costs by about 31 per cent 
between 2001 and 2005.20 Costs in 2004 were close to costs in Costa Rica which is a relatively 
low cost banana exporter (figure 7).  The suitability of Suriname for pursuing the industry 
expansion option is based on its topography, climate and the fact that the country is not 
vulnerable to natural disasters such as hurricanes. 
                                                     
19 “Suriname aiming to become CARICOM’s top banana producer”, December 7, 2007, Caribbean Net News 
(caribbeannetnews.com) 
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Although Belize is vulnerable to natural disasters it could pursue a similar strategy to 
Suriname given its large-scale banana holdings on suitable soils. The country’s production costs 
are relatively high but farms have been cutting labour and labour-related costs21 which have been 
feasible given the significant reliance on migrant farm labour from Guatemala and Honduras. 
However, improvement of the industry’s competitiveness in this way would be at the expense of 
improving the income and labour conditions of its banana workers.    
 
  Jamaica is also favourable for pursuing the expansion and competitiveness strategy. Its 
export banana industry is based on large-scale estates although labour costs are relatively high. It 
benefits from the large scale operations of the banana company (Jamaica Producers) which 
profitably ships and markets bananas (including dollar bananas) in the United Kingdom. One of 
the constraints on this strategy is that Jamaica, like Belize and the Windward Islands, is 
vulnerable to natural disasters. The country’s banana industry was devastated by Hurricane Dean 
in 2007. However, banana crops are relatively easy to resuscitate as they grow quickly and can 
be harvested in less than a year and throughout the year. 
 
Although some countries may be able to improve competitiveness in order to continue to 
export their bananas, under the new trading arrangement with the EU this may not be sustainable 
in the long term especially if prices continue to decline as a result of competition at the retail end 
of the chain. Alternative strategies would therefore have to be considered. Fair trade has become 
the option increasingly chosen by banana producers that are unable to sustain price competition 




 The option of improving price competitiveness and increasing production is less feasible 
for Windward Island banana exporters. The industry in the Windward Islands is based on small- 
scale farms, steep land, poor soils and relatively high labour costs. The islands are also 
vulnerable to natural disasters and were affected to various degrees by Hurricane Dean in 2007. 
The viability of their banana exports is therefore questionable despite the free access to the EU 
market under the EPA. Banana producers have been unable to meet the significant levels of 
investment required to improve quality and productivity and hence increase supply to the EU 
market. Value-added products and niche marketing such as fair trade are considered to be the 
only viable alternatives for the islands’ banana industry.22   
 
 The high cost of production and the erosion of preference for banana exports have 
already resulted in a shift in orientation of the banana industry in the Windward Islands. Farmers 
there now export bananas to the United Kingdom market under the Fairtrade label. Fairtrade 
banana exports have helped to sustain the banana industry in the islands and prevent its total 
collapse especially in Dominica.  
 
 Fairtrade banana shipments from the Windward Islands began in 2000. However, the 
Windward Islands Farmers National Association (WINFA) which was established in 1982 and 
                                                     
21 Alexandra Freedman “Belize and Bananas”, Z Magazine Online, February 2006, Volume 19, Number 2 
22 See NERA, Addressing the Impact of Preference Erosion in Bananas on Caribbean Economies: A Report for 





became a formal umbrella organization of farmers’ associations in 1987 to support small-scale 
farmers and deal with issues of banana farming and falling prices began working with Fairtrade 
in the 1990s. They set up Fairtrade Associations in each of the Windward Islands. By 2007 all of 
Dominica’s bananas and about 85 per cent of bananas in the Windward Islands were Fairtrade 
bananas. The Windward Islands supply a significant amount of Fairtrade bananas to the United 
Kingdom market (70 per cent) as well as to the European market (40 per cent).  
 
 Fairtrade is a concept that evolved as early as the 1940s and 1950s between community 
(and church) organizations in Europe and North America buying goods from counterpart 
organizations in developing countries. Now purchasing is done by shops and supermarkets. 
Fairtrade is a trading partnership geared toward promoting equity in international trade and 
providing a stable price for producers especially in the agricultural sector. The Fairtrade 
Labelling Organisations International (FLO) was set up in 1997 to set international Fairtrade 
standards. It issues a Fairtrade label which guarantees that the product meets Fairtrade standards. 
 
 Fairtrade standards are based on the principles of ethical trading, that is, no child or slave 
labour can be used in production; workers have the right to a safe working environment as well 
as the right to join a trade union; and production must go hand in hand with protection and 
conservation of the environment. Adherence to the latter means that banana farms would have to 
install buffer zones, refrain from the use of herbicides and control and reduce the use of 
pesticides and chemical fertilizers, among other things. Fairtrade principles constitute an 
intermediate stage between conventional production and organic production of bananas. It is a 
means of preparing farmers to move eventually towards organic production.  
 
 Under Fairtrade terms, producers are paid a Fairtrade minimum price to cover the costs of 
sustainable production – the price is calculated to cover full production costs plus a margin to 
cover basic needs and environmental standards. In addition, a social premium is paid to producer 
groups for social and environmental improvements in the community. The minimum price, 
which is based on average costs of production in the country, contributes to income stability 
since producers must be paid this price by buyers even if the market price for the product falls 
below the minimum price. 
 
1. Export Performance with Fairtrade   
 
 Changes in the EU banana import regime have had the most adverse effect on the 
Windward Islands of the Caribbean. Banana exports fell by more than half (53 per cent) during 
the 1990s – from 277,000 tonnes in 1990 to about 130,000 tonnes in 1999. In 2000 when the first 
shipment of Fairtrade bananas was made to the United Kingdom, total exports from the Islands 
were 140,000 tonnes, an increase of 10,000 over the previous year. However, the declining trend 
in exports continued from 140,000 tonnes in 2000 to 61,000 tonnes in 2006 again by more than 
half (56 per cent) since 2000. The decline was so significant in Grenada that exports from that 
island virtually ceased from 2005. However, hurricanes that occurred during the period largely 
contributed to the significant decline. 
 
 Grenada’s experience with Fairtrade exports has therefore been limited. The other 
Windward Islands of Dominica, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines had different 





before the first Fairtrade shipment was made, and 2001 to 2006 when Fairtrade exports became 
increasingly significant.  
 
 During the first sub-period banana exports declined by about one third in Dominica and 
Saint Lucia, but only by about 4 per cent in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. However, in the 
second sub-period the decline in Dominica was greater (36 per cent) but in Saint Lucia exports 
actually increased. In St. Vincent and the Grenadines the decline in exports accelerated in this 
phase (table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Windward Islands Banana Exports (Tonnes) 
 





1996 39,533 1,850 104,805 43,986 190,174 
1997 34,902 102 71,397 31,021 137,422 
1998 28,135 94 73,039 39,885 141,153 
1999 27,264 583 65,196 37,377 130,420 
2000 27,157 722 70,280 42,336 140,495 
2001 17,575 566 34,044 30,497 82,682 
2002 17,213 505 48,029 33,252 98,999 
2003 10,336 394 34,420 22,617 67,767 
2004 12,591 338 43,199 22,599 78,727 
2005 10,501 0 30,958 17,399 58,858 




 Despite the decline in the quantum of exports earnings stabilized in Dominica and 
increased significantly in Saint Lucia during the 2001-2006 period (table 4). On the other hand, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines experienced significant declines in revenue in both periods as the 
country was unable to reverse the declining trend of exports caused by a combination of factors, 
including the prevalence of banana leaf spot disease as well as the adverse effects of hurricanes 







Windward Islands Banana Export Revenues (US$M) 
 
Year Dominica Saint Lucia St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
1996 18.4 52.1 21.7 
1997 17.9 37.1 16.0 
1998 14.9 36.8 22.3 
1999 14.9 33.8 19.8 
2000 11.7 28.3 19.2 
2001 8.1 19.5 14.0 
2002 8.4 27.3 17.1 
2003 6.2 19.9 11.8 
2004 8.2 25.7 12.5 
2005 7.9 21.8 11.4 
2006 8.3 25.3 11.1 
Source: WIBDECO 
 
 Fairtrade has had a positive impact on the banana industry in the Windward Islands 
especially in Dominica and Saint Lucia. Farmers receive about US$1 more for each box of 
Fairtrade bananas exported compared to a box of conventional bananas. They, therefore, earn 
more than they would exporting conventional bananas in a situation of increased competition and 
declining price in import markets. Under Fairtrade standards producers secure long-term 
contracts from buyers and are guaranteed the minimum price regardless of falls in international 
prices. Buyers are also required to provide pre-financing on contracts if producers request it. 
 
 Fairtrade impact has not only been in terms of sustaining the earnings and hence 
livelihood of banana farmers but also in upgrading farming operations and improving social and 
environmental conditions within communities through the social premium paid to producer 
groups. The farmers’ association, WINFA, receives the Fairtrade premium of US$1.75 per box 
which is to be used for social and environmental projects. Some of the projects benefiting from 
the social premium were improvement to schools in Dominica, community centres in St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines and support for agro-processing in Saint Lucia. 
 
 An intangible but equally important benefit has been the enhancement of the social 
capital in rural communities. Farmers have increased their participation in meetings to discuss 
farming issues on account of their Fairtrade commitment.23 This has resulted in improved 
farming practices and product quality as well as increased community awareness and actions to 
resolve environmental and other issues that have adverse impact on agriculture as well as the 
quality of life in the communities.  
 
2. Sustainability of Fairtrade 
 
 Despite the positive impact of the Fairtrade initiative the question must be asked whether 
this export model is sustainable without State support and based only on market response. This 
                                                     





concern about sustainability stems from the recent criticisms by Fairtrade groups of the banana 
price war waged by leading supermarkets in the United Kingdom. Wal-Mart’s ASDA has been at 
the forefront of banana price cuts starting in 2002 when the supermarket cut the retail price of its 
bananas from ₤1.08 to 94p per kilogram. It cut banana prices again in 2005 and 2006 when its 
price was as low as 64p per kilogram. As a result of the price-cut competition between ASDA 
and the other major retailers, the former reduced its price further to 59p per kilogram in 2007.  
 
 Although the price cut affected loose bananas and not the packaged Fairtrade bananas, 
because it widened the price differential between conventional and Fairtrade bananas24 it has the 
potential to affect the demand for Fairtrade bananas among price sensitive consumers. Fairtrade 
banana sales in the United Kingdom have grown significantly from ₤7.9 million in 2000 to ₤65.6 
million in 2006 and more than doubled in 2007 to ₤150. This phenomenal growth in sales is 
largely due to the promotional and advocacy campaigns carried out by Fairtrade groups and the 
decision by some retailers such as Sainsbury and Waitrose to stock only Fairtrade bananas. In 
2002, the Fairtrade Mark was recognized by 20 per cent of the British public. By 2007 this 
increased to 57 per cent of the public.25 Despite this growth there is still potential for expansion 
of the Fairtrade market in the United Kingdom. This could however be affected by the significant 
reduction in price of conventional bananas. 
 
 Although Fairtrade is a market-based model – consumers “subsidize” production by 
paying the Fairtrade price – it is criticized for not responding to market signals,26 that is, it 
should signal to farmers to move out of production when prices fall significantly. But that would 
only be rational if the product is a mass market product. The Fairtrade market is so far a niche 
market where products are differentiated from their conventional market counterparts in terms of 
fair returns to the producers and improvement in social and environmental standards. Minimum 
prices for products are set by Fairtrade Standards and their viability is determined by the 
willingness and ability of consumers to support this concept of “fair” trade. Increased support 
and hence demand for Fairtrade bananas would increase the volume traded and therefore reduce 
costs such as shipping and packaging.27 
 
 Fairtrade has made a difference to the fortunes of banana producers in the Windward 
Islands particularly in Dominica where the banana industry seemed unlikely to survive after 
significant changes to the EU banana import regime due largely to WTO rulings against the 
regime. However, the islands remain vulnerable to natural disasters especially hurricanes which 
have adversely affected the banana industry. The Windward Islands as well as Jamaica have 
experienced a number of hurricanes since the devastating Hurricane Ivan in 200428 that 
practically wiped out the banana industry in Grenada. The latest Hurricane Dean had a 
devastating effect on the industry in a number of islands in 2007. The whole industry was 
practically destroyed in Dominica, Jamaica and the French island of Martinique; about two thirds 
                                                     
24 Fairtrade bananas have become more expensive than they were about 5 years ago. 
25 “Facts and Figures on Fairtrade” from www.fairtrade.org.uk 
26 “Fair trade is booming but is it still a fair deal?” UK Independent 24 February 2007  
27 Those costs tend to be higher on a per-unit basis for products imported in relatively small quantities. See for 
example “Are consumers getting a fair deal from Fairtrade products” at www.fairtrade.org.uk 





in Saint Lucia; 10 per cent in St. Vincent and the Grenadines; and about 80 per cent in the French 
island of Guadeloupe.29  
 
 The 2007 hurricane also adversely affected the islands’ Fairtrade exports especially in 
Dominica where virtually all banana exports were under the Fairtrade label. Although the islands 
received assistance towards rehabilitation from governments as well as marketing companies the 
concern is for viability of the industry given the serious damage from the hurricane, the relatively 
low banana prices in the United Kingdom market and the liberalization of the EU import regime 
under the Economic Partnership Agreements negotiated with ACP groups of countries.  
 
 The damage to Jamaica’s banana industry came at a time when Jamaica was moving 
towards becoming a Fairtrade exporter. The EU Banana Support Programme has been assisting 
the farmers certified under EUREPGAP30 to obtain certification under Fairtrade. Rehabilitation 
of the banana farms damaged by Hurricane Dean as well as the development of Fairtrade 
production is to be supported under a financing agreement for €6 million signed in January 2008 
by the European Commission.31 The Fairtrade option is still seen as a viable option for banana 
producing countries that are unable to compete with low-cost producers.  
 
3. EU Support Measures 
 
 At the same time the European Commission is supporting diversification to deal with the 
problem of lack of competitiveness in banana exports. Whereas diversification may be more 
easily pursued by companies and large estates such as in Jamaica, for example, it is a more 
difficult undertaking for farmers operating on relatively small plots on hilly terrain such as in the 
Windward Islands. Developing alternative crops also takes time and investment so that these 
islands would need a viable banana industry as a base from which to pursue development of new 
industries. However, Fairtrade alone would not guarantee the viability of the banana industry 
although an expansion of such trade would certainly help small-scale producers and farm 
workers. Developing capacity to take advantage of Fairtrade is critical for such producers. This is 
where European governments and the United Kingdom government in particular can provide 
support to banana farmers in the Caribbean islands. 
 
 Of equal or greater importance is the need to address the problem at the international 
trading level – bilateral as well as multilateral. The EPA concluded between the Caribbean 
(CARIFORUM) and the EU before the end of 2007 provides for tariff-free and quota-free access 
for Caribbean bananas to the EU market. EPA agreements with African ACP countries – interim 
agreements were made – will provide similar access for those countries. This is of concern to 
small Caribbean banana exporters such as the Windward Islands and Jamaica since African 
exporters such as Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire have been expanding their banana production and 
exports to the EU since the recent changes in the EU import regime.  
 
                                                     
29 Information obtained from www.bananalink.org.uk and other sources. 
30 EUREPGAP is a standard for good agricultural practice (GAP) developed by the Euro-Retailer Produce Working 
Group (EUREP) made up of leading European food retailers to ensure food safety by promoting good agricultural 
production practices based on international standards. EUREPGAP certification became mandatory from 2003 for 
produce exported to Europe. www.eurep.org  





 However, the concern is timely given the perceived strategy of multinational banana 
companies which were said to have influenced the countries where they operate banana 
plantations – Cameroon, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire – to sign an EPA agreements with the EU32. 
For example, Dole and Del Monte have been active in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire where they 
developed large-scale plantations and Chiquita was reported to be considering shifting some of 
its banana production from Latin America to Côte d’Ivoire and possibly Ghana and Somalia.33 
Chiquita, a United States-based company, was at the forefront of the challenge to the EU banana 
regime that discriminated in favour of ACP exporters. Now with the liberalization of ACP 
quotas, these multinational companies would be able to not only increase banana exports to the 
EU but also to export their bananas free of tariff. The losers would be the smaller producers in 
the Caribbean who cannot compete with the large-scale operations of the multinational 
companies. Producers in Latin America may also find themselves in a disadvantageous position 
since they would be competing against tariff-free exports from similar large-scale production in 
Africa. 
 
 One way to ensure that small-scale producers in the Caribbean are given a fair deal in 
their international trade is to increase advocacy for fair competition and fair trade rather than free 
competition and free trade. Whereas Fairtrade producers have to meet strict social and 
environmental requirements of Fairtrade standards there is no similar requirement at the end of 
the value chain. Retailers in the United Kingdom tend to be less concerned with the social and 
environmental conditions under which bananas are produced once the fruit satisfies their 
requirement in terms of product specification34 and price. For example, the supermarket ASDA 
was able to initiate a price war by significantly reducing its banana price after it awarded its 
entire banana supply contract to Del Monte based on the low price bid of that supplier.35 Higher 
standards at the retail end of the chain would prevent the “race to the bottom” in price as well as 
improve the conditions of banana workers. Such standards should be included in the contractual 
arrangements between retailers and suppliers.  
 
 At the multilateral level the EU and ACP countries should endeavour to have clauses 
included in WTO agreements that guarantee social and environmental standards. This will be a 
difficult undertaking given the GATT principle of non-discrimination which relates to products 
and not to processes and production methods and the failure to agree on labour and 
environmental standards at the Singapore conference in 1996. Developing countries have been 
the main objectors to the inclusion of such standards which they fear would be a form of 
protectionism by developed countries given the low costs of production in a number of 
developing countries.36 However, the low cost of production in some banana producing countries 
such as those in Latin America is based not only on large-scale production but also on poor 
labour and environmental standards. 
 
                                                     
32 See Alistair Smith, International Coordinator of Banana Link, “The Usual Last-minute Banana Peels” at 
www.bananalink.org.uk 
33 Renwick Rose, “The EPA and Bananas” www.bananalink.org.uk 
34 This refers to appearance such as shape, size, blemish and ripeness.  
35 “Caribbean Bananas: A Case for Equitable Trading” www.cbea.org 
36 See for example, Herman Van Beek, “The Importance of Social and Environmental Clausing for a Sustainable 





 The EU could enhance the production and fair trade of the small banana producers in the 
Caribbean by using its banana tariff (or some portion) to support the Fairtrade initiative as well 
as to develop the capacity of producers (particularly in the Windward Islands) to successfully 
manage “Fairtrade” banana operations and make the conversion where feasible to the production 
of organic bananas.37 This would be in keeping with its commitment in the Cotonou Agreement 
to ensure the viability of the industries that were covered by the commodity protocols.  However, 
since EU budget rules do not allow for targeting tariff revenue38 this would not be a feasible 
option. The EU could instead include the Windward Islands in the strategy for supporting the 
banana producers in the EU outermost regions in the Caribbean. 
 
4. Cooperation with EU banana producers in the Caribbean 
 
 The option of linking Caribbean banana producers in particular those in the Windward 
Islands with EU producers in the “outermost regions” of the EU is one that is worth exploring 
given both the interest of the EU as well as the Caribbean location of some of the regions. 
Banana production in the EU (16 per cent EU supply) takes place mainly in what are called the 
outermost regions of France, Portugal and Spain39 with a small amount (2 per cent) being 
produced in Cyprus, Greece and continental Portugal. It is the two outermost regions of France 
in the Caribbean, namely Guadeloupe and Martinique (hereafter referred to as “the regions”), 
that present the possibility of some level of integration (perhaps production integration) with the 
Windward Islands especially Dominica and Saint Lucia. 
 
 The regions are part of the European Union although they are geographically remote 
from Europe. Guadeloupe and Martinique have more in common with the Windward Islands in 
terms of size, topography, climate, insularity and economic dependence on a few products than 
with the mainland countries of the EU. They have benefited from the EU Structural Funds used 
to support development and productive employment in the regions. Those funds were 
supplemented by specific programmes (POSEI)40  to compensate for the insularity and 
remoteness of the regions. The programmes were geared toward improving infrastructure and 
modernizing traditional industries such as bananas, sugar and rum, among others.  
 
 Local production of agricultural goods including bananas is covered by the Common 
Market Organization (CMO) of the product under the CAP of the EU. Provision was made by 
the EU to compensate the regions for any loss of income41 consequent upon the implementation 
of the common organization of the market in bananas in 1993 so that producers were not placed 
in a worse position than before 1993. The maximum quantity of bananas for which compensation 
                                                     
37 A number of proposed uses of the EU banana tariff revenue are suggested in “Recycling EU Banana Tariff 
Revenues: A Proposal by the Organisers of the Second International Banana Conference”, January 2006 
38 Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, “Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade 
Dispute”, Journal of European Public Policy 13:3 April 2006, p.372 
39 The seven regions classified as outermost are Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana and Réunion (France), 
Azores and Madeira (Portugal) and the Canary Islands (Spain). 
40 The programme goes by its French acronym POSEI (Programme d’Options Spécifiques à l’Éloignement et 
l’Insularité). 
41 Compensation was calculated based on the difference between a flat-rate reference income (itself based on the 
average price produced during a reference period before 1993) and average income received in the EU in the 





would be paid was fixed at 854,000 tonnes. The EU would also pay a premium42 for the 
cessation of banana production in very small regions of the Community where conditions for 
such production were unsuitable. As part of the reform of the EU banana regime in 2006 and on 
the basis of an assessment of the impact of trade liberalisation on the EU banana producing 
regions, the European Commission abolished the compensation aid scheme and transferred funds 
instead to the POSEI for supporting banana producers in the regions.  
 
 The agricultural component of the POSEI programmes was devised to address the 
structural constraints of the regions such as the small size of holdings and high production costs. 
The measures implemented under the programmes are said to have contributed to improved 
quality and quantity of production.43 The Windward Islands have the same structural constraints 
as the regions and the EU has funded restructuring of the banana industry there as well. 
However, these measures have been separate for each set of countries. A more coherent and 
structured approach would be to support in an integrated way the development of the two regions 
and their agricultural sectors which play a crucial part in their overall development. 
 
 In the European Commission Report (2000) on the measures to implement the new 
Article 299(2) of the European Community Treaty, the Commission observed that a sustainable 
development strategy for the regions should include their integration within their regional 
geographical context or specifically regional cooperation between them and ACP Caribbean 
countries. In 2004 the Commission argued for a stronger partnership between the regions and 
neighbouring ACP countries within the context of enhancing economic integration in the EPA.44 
The Commission suggested the possibility of allocating funding to projects between the regions 
and ACP countries. This points the way for cooperation in agro-industrial development between 
the Windward Islands and the regions in areas including banana production and processing into 
value-added products. 
 
C. Diversification  
 
 Although the EU has been supporting the improvement of competitiveness of banana 
production in the Caribbean, it has also been supporting diversification in countries that would 
be unable to improve competitiveness. Funds were provided from 1994 under a “special system 
of assistance” (SSA) which was replaced in 1999 by a “special framework of assistance” (SFA). 
The latter provided for diversification out of bananas as well as enhancing competitiveness 
which had been the focus of the earlier support programme. Agricultural diversification is the 
focus of an agreement signed between the EU and the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) in Barbados in 2008 to provide support to the Windward Islands valued at €3.3 million 
over a three-year period.  
 
The tendency in Caribbean countries has been to focus the agriculture sector on a single 
agricultural export crop. This has to a large extent been encouraged by developed countries that 
                                                     
42 The premium was set at €1000 per hectare but could be adjusted depending on conditions in specific areas. 
43 See Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2) – the Outermost Regions of the European 
Union, COM/2000/0147. 






provided the markets for the crops. But developing dependence on a single crop makes it 
difficult to diversify especially when that crop loses its competitiveness in traditional markets. It 
also takes time to develop alternative agricultural industries. Efforts at diversification into 
industries that could replace the banana industry have not been successful so far. Nevertheless, 
the EU continues to support diversification in banana growing regions in order to provide 
alternative livelihoods to farmers and households dependent on the banana industry. What is new 
is that the EU now supports the development of Fairtrade banana production.45 This would help 
in sustaining livelihoods while new areas of growth could be explored and developed. 
 
One aspect of diversification that should be considered especially in light of rising food 
prices and shortages of some basic foods is orienting production towards local and regional 
markets. Part of EU support to diversification in Jamaica, for example, has been to encourage 
increased domestic consumption of bananas.46 Banana demand has grown significantly in the 
Caribbean region within the present decade.47 The tourism market is also a significant source of 
demand for the produce. Producers in the region would however have to improve quality and 
reliability of supply. Efficient transport is also a factor that has to be taken into account.  
                                                     
45 This support forms part of a financing agreement to assist Jamaican banana producers in January 2008. 
Freshplaza.com, February 1, 2008 
46 See ECLAC study on restructuring industries to meet the challenge of trade liberalization. 






V.  Changes in the EU sugar regime and the effect on Caribbean economies 
 
A. The sugar regime 
 
 The EU CMO for sugar, or EU Sugar Regime as it is better known, was established in 
1968 in order to achieve self-sufficiency in sugar supply and to guarantee a fair and stable 
income to beet sugar producers in EU member countries. The CMO regulated the sugar sector of 
the original members of the European Economic Community (EEC) (France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg). It provided minimum guaranteed prices for sugar, high 
import tariffs to maintain high internal prices and export refunds to ensure the competitiveness of 
EU sugar exports on the world market. At the same time production quotas were allocated in 
order to manage production levels. These were divided into an “A” quota approximately 
representing domestic demand, a “B” quota representing the surplus that could be exported and 
benefit from export refunds,48 and a “C” quota representing production over and above the “B” 
quota which must be exported without the export subsidy. Production levies were imposed on 
sugar beet growers and processors supplying sugar under both the A and B quotas to cover the 
cost of exporting quota sugar. 
 
 Cane sugar producers in former British territories in the Caribbean region had a 
guaranteed market for their sugar in the United Kingdom initially under the British Imperial 
Preference of 1919 and subsequently under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement of 1951. 
African sugar producers in the Associated African and Malagasy States gained preferential 
access to the markets of six members of the EEC under the Yaoundé Convention of 1963. 
Britain’s accession to the European Community in 1973 resulted in the negotiation of a new 
sugar arrangement – the first Lomé Convention of 1975 – between a larger group of ACP 
countries and nine member of the European Community including the United Kingdom. A Sugar 
Protocol (Protocol 22) was appended to the United Kingdom Treaty of Accession to the EU and 
incorporated the same guarantees that were contained in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. 
 
 The Sugar Protocol of the Lomé Conventions allowed ACP countries to export 1.4 
million tonnes of raw cane sugar annually for refining in the EU market at the same price as the 
guaranteed internal support price set for EU beet sugar producers. Caribbean countries were 
given allocations totaling 428,109 tonnes: Barbados 50,312, Belize 40,349, Guyana 159,410, 
Jamaica 118,696, St. Kitts/Nevis 15,591 and Trinidad and Tobago 43,751. The intervention or 
support price for sugar from which Caribbean exporters benefited was set since the 1993/1994 
crop year at €631.9 per tonne for white sugar and €523.7 per tonne for raw sugar. 
 
 Special quotas were also allocated under a Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) agreement 
negotiated in 1995 to supply additional refinery needs in the EU. The quota amounts are 
determined annually by the European Commission based on the refinery needs in the EU. SPS 
exports receive only about 85 per cent of the price obtained for ACP quota sugar. SPS quotas 
declined over the years (37 per cent 1995 to 2003) but Caribbean quotas declined more 
                                                     
48 These are the payments to EU sugar exporters to compensate for the difference between high EU prices and lower 





significantly (61 per cent over the same period)49. The SPS is expected to last for the duration of 
the Sugar Regime (2006).50 
 
 A critical factor in the reform of the EU CMO for sugar was the WTO negotiations that 
were geared toward further liberalizing import tariffs and eliminating export subsidies, which 
would significantly impact the highly protected EU sugar market. At the same time, as was the 
case with bananas, the EU sugar export subsidies and guaranteed price for sugar were challenged 
at the WTO in 2002 by Australia and Brazil. A Dispute Settlement Body was set up in August 
2003 and reported in August 2004 in favour of the countries that challenged the sugar regime.  
 
 This development as well as criticisms of the structure of the sugar regime led the EU to 
make proposals for reform beginning in September 2003. Agreement was reached in November 
2005 on the first major reform of the EU sugar regime since it was established in the late 1960s.  
EU sugar prices are to be cut by 36 per cent over four years (2006/2007 – 2009/2010) moving 
from €523.7 per tonne in 2005/06 to €496.8 per tonne in 2006/07; €448.8 per tonne in 2008/09; 
and finally to €335.2 per tonne in 2009/10.  Restructuring of the EU sugar industry is expected to 
be voluntary aimed at reducing production by around six million tonnes over the same period. 
These measures are expected to facilitate EU compliance with the recent WTO ruling to limit 
subsidized exports. Incentives from a restructuring fund have been provided for sugar beet 
growers to renounce specific amounts of their quota. However, the European Commission is 
prepared to make compulsory quota cuts if growers do not renounce sufficient quota by 2010.51 
 
 Under the EPA negotiated between the EU and ACP groups of countries duty free and 
quota free access to the EU market will be provided for sugar from 2015 subject to a special 
safeguard clause. There are two phases in the transition to 2015. In the first phase from the 
beginning of 2008 to the end of September 2009, Caribbean and ACP countries will continue to 
receive guaranteed prices for sugar albeit at reduced prices. From the beginning of October 2009 
countries would continue to have duty free access but within a ceiling of 3.5 million tonnes of 
sugar exports from all ACP countries. However, the guaranteed price received could fall short of 
the EU price since importers of ACP sugar are not required to pay the full EU reference price but 
only at least 90 per cent of that price until September 2012. After 2012 only a price information 
system would be available to determine the prices to be negotiated between importers and 
exporters. 52 
 
 Caribbean and other ACP sugar exporters will be adversely affected by the reforms. The 
EU reform proposes support to ACP countries affected by the reform measures. Such support 
will be mainly in terms of improving international trading conditions for ACP countries; 
enhancing competitiveness of the sugar sectors of such countries where sustainable; and 
promoting diversification of sugar-dependent areas. Achieving competitiveness will be directed 
at both the sugar industry and the sugar cane industry with the objective of adding value to the 
sugar cane as well as sugar products. European Community assistance to Caribbean and ACP 
                                                     
49 Donald Mitchell, “Sugar in the Caribbean: Adjusting to Eroding Preferences”, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3802, December 2005, p.6 
50 Ian Gillson, Adrian Hewitt and Sheila Page, “Forthcoming Changes in the EU Banana and Sugar Markets: A 
Menu of Options for an Effective EU Transitional Package”, Policy Brief, Overseas Development Institute 
51 “Sugar Reform: Council backs improved sugar restructuring scheme” IP/07/1401 Brussels, 26 September 2007 





countries would be provided for 2006 but continued support will be available until 2013 through 
the development portion of the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation 
Instrument. 
 
B. Effect of changes in sugar regime  
 
 Since the reform of the EU sugar regime has taken place only recently the time period 
would be too short to assess its impact in terms of Caribbean sugar export performance in the 
post-reform period from 2007. Nevertheless, some insight can be gained from the pre-reform 
period as well as from prospective assessments that were undertaken in light of the reforms and 
the negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements to replace the previous trade regimes 
between the EU and ACP countries. 
 
 Sugar exports from Caribbean sugar producing countries, with the exception of Belize, 
have been on the downswing from the late 1960s; in the case of the Dominican Republic decline 
occurred from the 1970s (figure 8), which  was due largely to declining sugar cane production in 
most of the countries, again with the exception of Belize (figure 9). The most significant decline 
occurred from the late 1960s up to the early 1980s in the case of Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago and from the late 1960s up to the early 1990s in the case of Barbados and Guyana. 
Guyana made a remarkable recovery from 1991 due largely to the privatization of the 
management of the State-owned sugar company. What is interesting to note is the association of 
ownership structure and management of the sugar industry with the growth of sugar exports. 
State ownership has coincided with the downswing of the sugar industry.  Privatisation of 
management especially in Guyana stemmed the decline of the 1980s. 
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 Caribbean sugar exports declined during a period when world sugar exports and world 
sugar consumption increased significantly. Exports remained more or less at EU quota levels. 
The factors that influenced the decline of sugar exports were domestic, related to production and 
management inefficiencies and high costs in State-owned sugar operations. The economic rent or 
income transfer from the EU sugar preference sustained the sugar industry in the Caribbean but, 
with the exception of Guyana, did not contribute toward restructuring the industry to improve 
efficiency and reduce costs.  
 
 Reduction in the guaranteed price for sugar in the EU market will have a significant 
impact on the sugar industry in most Caribbean countries given the fact that most of the 
industries were not restructured to improve competitiveness. Export earnings for the region will 
decline by over half (52 per cent) over the four years of the reform period as shown in table 5 
assuming that countries export their full quota. For Caribbean countries to maintain the same 
level of earnings prior to the reform, they would have to increase the volume of their exports by 
about 56 per cent over the four year period (table 6). This would only be possible if the sugar 
quota is increased. An increase in the Caribbean quota was announced consequent upon the 
conclusion of an EPA between the EU and the CARIFORUM group; 60,000 tonnes would be 
added to the group’s quota with 30,000 to be shared among the CARICOM countries and 30,000 

































Barbados 34.9 18.3 17.3 15.7 11.7 
Belize 43.9 23.0 21.8 19.7 14.7 
Guyana 173.3 90.7 86.1 77.8 58.1 
Jamaica 129.0 67.6 64.1 57.9 43.2 
St. Kitts/Nevis 16.9 8.9 8.4 7.6 5.7 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
47.6 24.9 23.6 21.3 15.9 
Total Caribbean 445.6 313.5 221.3 200.0 149.3 
New Quota with 
30,000 tonnes 
from 2008 to 2009 
475.6   213.4 159.4 
 Source: Stephen Thornhill, “Safeguarding the Benefits of the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol in the Context  
 of the EPA Negotiations, 28 February 2007; and author’s calculations for earnings based on the new 




Caribbean Sugar Export Volume Required to Maintain Current Export Earnings 
Based on €523.7/t 
 













Barbados 34.9 36.8 40.7 54.5 
Belize 43.9 46.3 51.2 68.5 
Guyana 173.3 182.7 202.2 270.7 
Jamaica 129.0 136.0 150.5 201.6 
St. Kitts/Nevis 16.9 17.9 19.8 26.5 
Trinidad &Tobago 47.6 50.1 55.5 74.3 
Total Caribbean 445.6 469.8 519.9 696.1 
 Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 With the reduction in price and increase in quota the total earnings of CARICOM 
countries would increase from €200 in 2008 to €226.9 in 2009 or by 13 per cent more in each of 
those years (table 5). These earnings would however represent a reduction of 46 per cent of the 
earnings of 2005/2006 or 6 per cent less than the decline in earnings they would experience 






 Increased tonnage would not be the answer to the EU sugar price reduction if the EU is 
unable to reduce its production quota by the targeted 6 million tonnes over the four-year period 
since that would only create surplus on the EU market and lead to further price decline. The 
amount of EU quota renounced so far has been below the target set by the European Commission 
which may now have to make compulsory cuts to manage production in light of the EU WTO 
commitments. Nevertheless, further price reduction may be inevitable given the EU decision to 
liberalise its sugar imports from ACP countries that sign EPA agreements and the need to 
significantly reduce its domestic production.     
 
 Although increased exports would help Caribbean producers to maintain their export 
earnings from the EU market, it may not be practicable for most countries to increase production 
given limited resources and high costs of production. Cost of production data are difficult to 
obtain. However, estimates show that Belize and Guyana have the lowest costs whereas St. 
Kitts/Nevis and Trinidad & Tobago have the highest costs. Barbados and Jamaica have relatively 
high costs compared to Belize and Guyana (table 7). With a €335 per tonne price for sugar in 
2010 only countries from Mozambique to Congo would be able to export to the EU market 
without incurring losses. This group includes the CARICOM countries of Guyana, Belize and 
Jamaica. In the event of a 50 per cent price cut after another round of EU reforms in 2013 no 
Caribbean country will be able to export profitably to the EU. 
 
 Guyana is considered to be the only country in the CARICOM region whose sugar 
industry will remain financially viable given the EU sugar price cut. Nevertheless, the country 
will need to prevent costs from rising in the event of further reduction in the EU sugar price.  
Despite being a lower cost producer Belize may not be able to survive the significant price 
reduction given its cost structure.53 
 
                                                     
53 The prospects for CARICOM and other ACP sugar producers are discussed in LMC International & Oxford 




























Mozambique 141 68 209 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Malawi 141 92 233 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Zimbabwe 158 84 242 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Swaziland 176 76 252 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Zambia 141 116 257 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Guyana 211 76 287 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Mauritius 229 64 293 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Belize 211 92 303 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Fiji 229 80 309 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Jamaica 264 56 320 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Tanzania 211 120 331 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Congo 229 104 333 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Côte d’Ivoire 264 112 376 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Kenya 264 120 384 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Madagascar 317 80 397 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Barbados 352 60 412 533.7 335.0 261.8 
St.Kitts/Nevis 440 80 520 533.7 335.0 261.8 
Trinidad & Tobago 440 80 520 533.7 335.0 261.8 







VI. Options for Caribbean sugar producers 
 
A. Industry expansion 
 
 The sugar industry in Guyana is best positioned to take advantage of the liberalization of 
the EU market under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. Guyana embarked on a restructuring 
programme in 2005 to improve the price competitiveness of its sugar industry as well as 
diversify into other sugar-related areas such as refining, co-generation and ethanol production.54 
The centerpiece of the plan is the (US$170 million) Skeldon Modernisation Project which 
involves the construction of a new sugar factory to replace the existing one at Skeldon in the 
north east of Guyana. One of the objectives of the project is to reduce the cost of production by 
about one third from about US.8 cents per kilogram (US.18 cents per pound) to less than US.5 
cents per kilogram (US.11 cents per pound). Another objective is to supply power to the national 
electricity grid. The new sugar factory was designed with a co-generation facility capable of 
providing 10 megawatts of power to the national grid.   
 
 The Skeldon factory which was scheduled to come on stream in 2007 is now expected to 
be commissioned in 2008. Latest reports indicate that the factory is nearing completion with tests 
being currently performed on the various components of the factory’s operations. The factory is 
expected to eventually reach its capacity to process 1.2 million tonnes of cane annually into more 
than 100,000 tonnes of sugar.55 However, achievement of the targeted sugar output of the factory 
is dependent on the supply of cane to the new factory. Additional production of sugar cane is 
expected to come from 8,900 hectares of new estate lands as well as farmers’ lands being 
developed.  
 
 The new Skeldon factory is considered to be a state-of-the-art factory in the Caribbean, 
incorporating relatively new and modern technology to achieve high levels of efficiency. 
Attention therefore has to be paid to the skills requirement for managing and operating the 
facility. Both local and foreign expertise have been recruited to ensure that the factory operates at 
its required high standard. While skilled labour is being recruited for the Skeldon operations, 
conversion from manual labour to machines is being pursued on the East Demerara Estates in 
order to reduce costs and in light of the decline of the labour force. 
 
 Expanding production, improving efficiency and reducing costs will allow the Guyana 
sugar industry to maintain its profitability in relation to its exports to the EU market. In addition, 
the Guyana Sugar Corporation (GuySuCo) has diversified its sugar production into packaged 
branded sugar and into organic sugar on a trial basis. Since the introduction of its packaged 
‘Demerara Gold’ sugar in 2003, sales increased from 600 tonnes in 2003 to 7000 tonnes in 2007. 
Most of the packaged sugar is sold in the Caribbean whereas raw bulk sugar is sold mainly in the 
EU and United States markets.  
 
                                                     
54 For a discussion of the restructuring options for the sugar industry in CARICOM countries see ECLAC, 
Restructuring  Caribbean Industries to Meet the Challenge of Trade Liberalisation, Limited LC/CAR/L.77, 21 
December 2005 





 Belize, like Guyana, may be able to successfully pursue the industry expansion option 
since its sugar industry expanded significantly over the years and has a relatively low cost of 
production. However, restructuring of the industry would have to be pursued to improve 
efficiency, increase sugarcane yield and hence quantity of sugar. This is the strategy that Belize 
adopted in light of the price cut announced by the EU in 2005. Belize had also proposed that the 
EU increase the country’s sugar quota from 42,000 to 100,000 tonnes in order to offset the sugar 
price reduction.56 Under its sugar adaptation strategy for 2006-2013 financed by the European 
Union, Belize is to enhance the competitiveness of its sugarcane and sugar industries as well as 
pursue diversification.57 
 
 Despite its high cost of production Jamaica could also pursue the industry expansion 
option. The government had indicated its intention to retain sugar production to meet a target of 
138,000 tonnes for its export markets. The reform strategy would focus on the production of 
molasses and ethanol in addition to the production of raw sugar. The State-owned sugar factories 
are to be privatized with the expectation of attracting investment to modernize them and thus 
increase their efficiency. If this could be done successfully then Jamaica could take advantage of 
the market liberalization under the EPA which will come into effect from 2010. However, 
expansion of sugar production to take advantage of new market access would be dependent on 
the strategy of the new owners of the five sugar factories that are being sold. 
 
The sale of the factories and the leasing of the sugar cane lands are expected to be 
completed by mid-2008. The sugar assets of the government are likely to be acquired by a 
Brazilian company which was the only company to follow through on its original bid. The 
conditions governing the sale would guarantee pursuit of the government’s reform strategy based 
on diversification within the sugar industry.58 Brazil is a significant producer of both sugar and 
ethanol but does not have the free access that Jamaica has to the EU market for sugar or the 
United States market for ethanol. The industry expansion model to increase production becomes 
more feasible for Jamaica in light of the efficient production of sugar and ethanol in Brazil by the 
prospective investor.59  
 
B. Specialty and high value sugar 
 
 The option of moving from the export of bulk sugar to that of special higher value sugars 
is more appropriate for Barbados which is a high cost producer of sugar. It would be difficult for 
Barbados to substantially expand its sugar production and significantly reduce its costs to take 
advantage of the new access for CARIFORUM sugar to the EU market. This is so for at least 
two reasons. One is the inability of the industry to meet its full costs which could adversely 
                                                     
56 ECLAC, Restructuring  Caribbean Industries to Meet the Challenge of Trade Liberalisation, Limited 
LC/CAR/L.77, 21 December 2005 
57 “Sugar Sector to Receive BZD$7 million under Sugar Adaptation Strategy”, European Union Press Release, 
Belmopan, 22/02/07 
58 The government is to absorb the debt of the Sugar Company of Jamaica which owns the five factories on 
condition that the new owner invests in the upgrading of the factories and cater towards new value added markets. 
“Infinity BioEnergy, Government of Jamaica commence sugar negotiations – June sale still targeted”. Gleaner 
(Jamaica), April 2, 2008 
59 The Brazilian company is said to produce sugar at about one third the cost of production in Jamaica. Gleaner 





affect the investment required to improve efficiency and hence reduce costs.60 The other is the 
difficulty in increasing the amount of sugar cane required for expansion of sugar production.  
 
 Barbados has a limited amount of arable land. A significant amount of agricultural land 
(about 38 per cent) is already under sugar cane although the area harvested has declined 
significantly over the years; area harvested declined by more than half since 1970 (from about 
20,000 hectares in 1970 to about 7,000 hectares in 2006). The growth of housing and tourism has 
constrained the availability of land for significant expansion of agriculture. Barbados has 
adopted a different strategy for sustaining its sugar industry by focusing on its sugar cane 
industry and new products derived from it.  
 
 Based on a strategic plan for restructuring the sugar industry, a new multi-purpose facility 
is being set up to replace the two existing sugar factories at Bulkeley and Portvale and is 
expected to begin operations in 2010. The target is for the facility to produce 20,000 tonnes of 
specialty sugar. Along with sugar the facility is expected to produce 23 million litres of ethanol, 
36,445 tonnes of high grade molasses and 20 megawatts of electricity from the bagasse.61 To 
achieve the last target, test fields of (high fibre) fuel cane have been cultivated. The strategic plan 
is also linking the sugar industry to the tourism industry through a plan for a ‘Living’ Sugar 
Museum at the Bulkeley factory that will demonstrate a live interpretation of the history of sugar 
in Barbados. A historical sugar museum (Sir Frank Hutson Museum) already exists at the 
Portvale Sugar Factory. 
 
 The production of specialty sugar has already begun. The ‘Plantation Reserve’ brand of 
sugar was launched in Barbados in 2006 and has been exported within the Caribbean as well as 
to the United Kingdom. The brand is targeted towards an upper end niche market and as such is 
more expensive than regular sugar. At a price of ₤5 per tin (500 grammes) Barbados received 
₤100,000 or US$203,000 for 20,000 tins (10 tonnes) sold in the United Kingdom in September 
200762. The sugar is sold in up-market stores such as Harrods and Selfridges in the United 
Kingdom. The marketing success of the sugar can be attributed to the nature of the marketing 
company, West Indies Sugar and Trading Company (WISTCO), which is a joint venture between 
the government-owned Barbados Agricultural Management Company (BAMC) and HIPAC 
Limited – a subsidiary of a private sector company Goddard Enterprises Limited – but also 
includes British interests that would have been instrumental in securing sales outlets in the 
United Kingdom.63 
 
                                                     
60 Full costs are those that include depreciation allowance and return on capital employed. See LMC International & 
Oxford Policy Management, “Addressing the Impact of Preference Erosion in Sugar on Developing Countries” 
September 2003 for assessment of the current and future profitability of sugar production in ACP countries. 
61 The sugar industry restructuring plan was devised by a previous government. The new government which recently 
came into office is still to reveal its plan for the sugar industry. 
62 The objective, according to the Managing Director of WISTCO, is to realize this amount of sales every month 
throughout the UK. Nation Newspaper, “Sweet Taste of Success” 10/3/07 
63 HIPAC’s contribution is expertise gained through decades of manufacturing international brands such as 
Cockspur Rum whereas BAMC contribution is in the area of sugar manufacturing. The UK investors provide the 






 The Plantation Reserve Model is of interest for at least two reasons, the way the sugar is 
produced and the returns to the producers. The sugar is milled and not refined, as is the case with 
regular sugar, using ‘high sucrose’ canes that are harvested at the height of the season, that is, 
when the sucrose content is at its highest. It is not subject to the centrifugal process used for 
producing traditional sugar which removes the molasses from the sugar. It is instead heated to 
produce crystals that are lighter and coarser than other raw cane sugars. It is therefore like the 
whole sugars such as Muscovado sugar, which are unrefined, non-centrifugal cane sugars. Such 
sugars retain most of their nutrients and fetch higher prices than refined sugars in European 
markets. 
 
 WISTCO pays almost twice as much as the EU price for the sugar it buys from the 
producers. The payment more than covers the cost of harvesting the cane and producing the 
sugar. It also provides support for development programmes. The model is similar to the 
Fairtrade initiative that pays prices which cover costs of production as well as a premium for 
development of the surrounding communities. The difference is that whereas Fairtrade sales are 
based largely on the ethical nature of the product, the specialty sugar sales are based on the 
luxury nature of the product. For Barbados to be successful with this model it will have to 
significantly increase sales in order to justify investment in the Multi-Purpose Facility as well as 
meet the target of sales of 20,000 tonnes of specialty sugar.  
 
 Barbados will have to significantly increase production to meet its target. Its strategy is 
mainly to increase cane yield although cultivating sugar cane on idle agricultural land is also to 
be considered. This makes sense despite the increase in the sugar yield of milled cane. Sugar 
cane yield and area harvested have both been declining. For example, sugar cane yield declined 
from 64 tonnes per hectare in 1996 to 52 tonnes per hectare in 2006. Area harvested also 
declined significantly from 8,400 hectares to 6,674 hectares over the same period (table 8). 
 
Table 8 
















1996 8400 534,886 64 59,114 9.05 
1997 8900 570,872 64 64,613 8.84 
1998 8100 448,741 55 47,971 9.35 
1999 8200 521,897 64 53,196 9.81 
2000 8700 537,571 62 58,374 9.21 
2001 8467 419,466 50 49,796 8.42 
2002 7878 417,847 53 44,819 9.32 
2003 7514 364,555 49 36,325 10.04 
2004 6992 361,237 52 34,358 10.51 
2005 7067 442,436 63 38,241 11.57 
2006 6674 348,335 52 33,701 10.34 







C. Fairtrade and organic sugar 
 
 The growth in the Fairtrade market has taken place in the last couple of years. The United 
Kingdom is the largest European market for Fairtrade products that have been sold since the 
1990s. Sainsbury Supermarket in the United Kingdom announced it would switch to Fairtrade 
sugar by March 2008. Tate & Lyle of the United Kingdom also announced in February 2008 that 
it would convert all its own brand retail cane sugar to Fairtrade by the end of 2009. The company 
will source 70,000 tonnes certified Fairtrade sugar from Belize in the first phase of its Fairtrade 
sugar programme. Tate & Lyle along with the Belize Sugar Cane Farmers Association and the 
Belize Sugar Industries which process the sugar worked with the Fairtrade Foundation to assist 
cane farmers in northern Belize meet the fair trade standards. 
 
 Tate & Lyle distributes to retailers in the United Kingdom its own brand name sugar that 
it sources from countries like Belize. Its granulated white cane sugar from Belize will be the first 
product to carry the Fairtrade mark and will be sold initially by Waitrose and Nisa in the United 
Kingdom. The conversion to Fairtrade will benefit more than 6,000 small-scale cane farmers in 
Belize who are members of the Belize Sugar Cane Farmers Association. That association would 
be the organization to receive the Fairtrade social premium for development purpose in the 
communities in northern Belize. Tate & Lyle would market the sugar in the United Kingdom as 
it has done for over 35 years. 
 
 The move towards Fairtrade sugar in Belize fits in well with conditions in the country 
which is prone to natural disasters and experienced significant damage to its agricultural sector 
from Hurricane Dean in 2007. Sugar cane is produced by independent small-scale farmers who 
lost a significant amount of sugar cane due to the passage of the hurricane. The loss would have 
affected both sugar production and exports and hence the earnings of the cane farmers. Fairtrade 
would also contribute towards some of the objectives of the Belize Sugar Adaptation Strategy 
such as improvement of the incomes of cane farmers as well as the social conditions in sugar 
dependent areas.  
 
 The Fairtrade sugar sold by Tate & Lyle increases significantly the amount of Fairtrade 
sugar sold in the United Kingdom. However, that sugar is refined or white sugar that fetches a 
lower price than whole sugars which are not refined. Belizean farmers would therefore benefit to 
a lesser extent than their counterparts in Mauritius and Paraguay. One of the Fairtrade sugars 
from Mauritius sold in the United Kingdom is a dark muscovado sugar whereas the Fairtrade 
sugar from Paraguay is an organic raw cane sugar. These sugars are advertised in terms of taste 
and suggested uses are for cereal, coffee and making cakes.  
 
To move towards production and export of Fairtrade higher value unrefined sugar would 
require the kind of initiative adopted by Barbados in relation to its specialty sugar. Branding is 
an importing factor in increasing the value of the product as can be observed in the case of one of 
the Fairtrade sugars from Mauritius sold in the United Kingdom. That sugar is sold under the 
brand ‘Demerara Sugar’ which has caused concern in Guyana where Demerara sugar has been 





has had difficulty registering its ‘Demerara Gold’ brand which was challenged in Canada by a 
company that packages the Mauritius sugar.64 
 
 Organic sugar production is somewhat similar to the production of Fairtrade sugar. In fact 
it is the ultimate stage of Fairtrade production or rather Fairtrade production is an intermediate 
stage towards organic production. The standards are more difficult to meet for organic sugar 
production. Countries with large sugar estates such as Belize, Guyana and Jamaica are suitable 
for such production. However, the costs of production in meeting the standards set for organic 
production may be high. Guyana embarked on organic sugar production as a pilot project on the 
West Demerara Estate of Uitvlugt. The project’s object is to determine whether GUYSUCO 
would be able to produce sugar using the organic method of production. Its output is earmarked 
for the United Kingdom market. Evaluation of the organic trial could inform the decision to 
produce organic sugar in other Caribbean countries. 
 
D. Possible exit from sugar industry 
 
 The highest cost producers, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago, have moved 
away from producing sugar for the EU market. They have been the least dependent on the sugar 
industry; the economy of St. Kitts and Nevis relies more on the tourism industry whereas 
Trinidad and Tobago relies more on its energy sector. However, in light of the significant 
increases in the price of oil, St. Kitts and Nevis is considering resumption of sugar cane 
production in order to develop biofuels based on sugar cane.  
 
Trinidad and Tobago, which was expected to exit the sugar industry, continues to 
produce refined sugar at the State-owned Sugar Manufacturing Company Limited (SMCL). The 
government decided to maintain the Ste. Madeleine refinery to provide the sugar input to the 
food and beverage industries in the country. It is proposed to upgrade the refinery to produce 
100,000 tonnes of refined sugar or 40,000 tonnes more than is currently being produced as well 
as improve the efficiency of SMCL.65 The sugar produced is sold locally as well as exported 
mainly to CARICOM countries.  
 
Both St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago would not altogether cease sugar cane 
and sugar production given the high price of oil and increased demand for commodities on the 
international market. Sugar cane farmers are still willing to remain in sugar cane production. 
There are at least 3,000 cane farmers in Trinidad and Tobago supplying cane to SMCL for the 





                                                     
64 “Demand for Packaged ‘Demerara’ Sugar Outstrips Supply – will be met when Skeldon comes on stream”, 
Stabroek News, 25 November 2007  





VII. Changes in the EU rice regime and the effect on Caribbean countries 
 
A. The rice regime 
 
 Rice is one of the agricultural products covered by the CAP whose objectives include 
market stabilization and a fair standard of living for farmers. Rice is traded freely within the EU. 
The CMO for rice (as well as for the other products covered by the CMO) has rules to regulate 
production and trade in all the member countries of the EU. A common intervention price 
provides a floor to domestic market prices. An import tariff system protects internal prices and 
export refunds compensate for the gap between domestic and world prices.  
 
Rice is produced in specific countries of the EU namely Italy, Spain, Greece, France and 
Portugal. Italy and Spain are the major producers although the EU as a whole is not a major 
producer of rice accounting for only 0.5 per cent of world rice production. The EU is however 
one of the largest importers of rice as well as one of the largest exporters of rice. Its rice exports 
have been facilitated by its export subsidies and its surplus production which in turn has been 
encouraged by its agricultural policies. The limitation on the amount of subsidized exports under 
the WTO resulted in significant increase in the intervention stocks66 by the end of the 1990s. The 
high costs of intervention had an adverse effect on the EU budget which led to the 2003 reforms.  
 
 The main suppliers of rice to the EU are the United States, Thailand, India and Guyana.  
The EU imports a substantial amount (about two thirds) of rice on preferential terms. Imports 
from ACP countries are subject to quotas and reduced tariff. The quotas were introduced in 1997 
to limit Guyana’s exports that were channeled through the Overseas Countries and Territories 
(OCT) and hence entered the EU market free of tariff67. Three sets of quotas apply to the 
different types of rice:  
 
• 125,000 tonnes husked rice equivalent 
• 35,000 tonnes husked rice equivalent via OCT 
• 20,000 tonnes broken rice 
 
 The 35,000 tonnes of husked rice that can be exported through the OCT enter the EU 
market free of tariff. The quotas of other rice enter at reduced tariff. The quotas are administered 
through import licences issued by the European Commission to EU rice importers.  Tariffs were 
further reduced as part of the rice sector reform of 2003 (table 9). The reduction applied to 
husked brown rice and semi-milled or milled white rice. 
 
                                                     
66 Intervention stocks accumulate when both production and imports increase and (subsidized) exports are limited. 






EU Rice Tariffs Prior to the 2003 Reform and After the Reform (€/t) 
 













In the Husk (Paddy) 211 69.51 211 69.51 
Husked (Brown Rice) 264 88.06 65 21.67 
Semi-milled or Milled (White) 416 133.21 175 58.33 
Broken  128 41.18 128 41.18 
 Source: Commission of the European Communities “Commission Staff Working Paper: Rice” Brussels, 
 10/7/2002 and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report, 4/26/2005 
 
 
 Reform of the EU rice regime began in 1995 with a 15 per cent reduction of the 
intervention price for rice over a three-year period. The price therefore fell from €351 per tonne 
in 1997/98 to €298.35 per tonne in 1999/2000. EU farmers were however compensated for this 
reduction by direct payments of €17.5 per tonne in 1997/1998, €35.1 per tonne in 1998/99 and 
€52.6 per tonne in 1999/2000. A ceiling was also placed on the area for rice production in the EU 
in order to discourage overproduction. These measures had only a limited effect on the reduction 
in intervention stocks which had increased again by 19 per cent in 2003. 
 
 The failure to restrict the growth of intervention stocks and the fear that they would 
increase even more with the proposed liberalization of less developed countries (LDC) access to 
the EU market under the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement resulted in a further reform of 
the rice regime in 2003. The intervention price for rice was reduced (by 50 per cent) to €150 per 
tonne to bring it in line with world market prices by 2004/2005. At the same time direct aid 
payments to farmers were increased to €177 per tonne. However, the Maximum Guaranteed 
Areas for rice production was reduced. These changes were expected to contain the level of EU 
rice imports and thus reduce intervention stocks of rice.  
 
 One year after the reform production increased by 6 per cent, the area of rice production 
increased by 5 per cent and exports increased by 45 per cent. The decline in the intervention 
price did not have a significant impact on imports which declined only by 1 per cent. However, it 
did contribute to the decline (by 50 per cent) of intervention stocks. EU farmers were not 
adversely affected as they benefited from aid payments. It is imports that bore the burden of the 
EU reform measures. 
 
B. Effect of changes in rice regime 
 
 The main ACP exporters of rice to the EU are Guyana and Suriname, the two South 
American mainland countries in CARICOM. Guyana is the largest exporter ranking fourth in the 
world in 2004. Guyana’s rice production and exports increased significantly during the 1990s 





route.68 By 1996 about 90 per cent of exports were channeled through the OCT. The reduction of 
the EU intervention price in 1995 and the introduction of quotas to restrict exports via the OCT 
route resulted in a decline in exports to the EU and an even more significant decline in export 
earnings. Suriname also experienced similar decline in exports and earnings (table 11). 
 
Table 10 













1990 51,368 3.0 93,444 50,943 
1991 76,209 3.3 150,783 54,047 
1992 77,327 3.7 171,000 115,102 
1993 98,061 3.4 201,702 124,089 
1994 97,660 3.8 233,111 182,585 
1995 132,344 3.9 315,301 200,336 
1996 135,436 4.0 332,542 262,265 
1997 142,782 3.9 340,911 285,051 
1998 129,469 4.0 339,890 249,755 
1999 147,071 3.8 365,469 251,519 
2000 115,872 3.8 291,967 207,638 
2001 124,565 3.9 322,310 209,042 
2002 107,902 4.1 288,375 193,416 
2003 127,662 4.3 355,019 200,432 
 Source: Guyana Rice Development Board – Production Data 1990-2003 
 
 
 The unavailability of data precludes an assessment of the impact of the reforms of 2003, 
that is, both the reduction in the intervention price and the ACP tariffs. Guyana’s exports 
increased by almost 30 per cent in 2004 after the EU tariff on husked rice, the main type of rice 
export to the EU was reduced by 75 per cent. The EU intervention price was reduced by 50 per 
cent but it is not clear that the tariff reduction offset the reduction of the price paid for ACP rice.  
 
                                                     
68 Guyana exported husked rice to Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao and Turks & Caicos – countries referred to as OCT – 
where the rice is further processed and then exported free of tariff to the EU. The OCT group consists of British, 
French, Dutch and Danish territories that are constitutionally linked to member States of the EU and hence have 






Guyana and Suriname Earnings from Exports to EU 2001-2004 
 













2001 99,246 318.6 31,620 27,152 341.2 9,264 
2002 93,083 298.0 29,229 40,789 302.8 12,351 
2003 101,123 258.9 26,181 21,194 265.5 5,627 
2004 131,133 241.4 31,655 17,366 257.0 4,463 
Source: Adapted from table in Agritrade “Rice: Executive Brief” April 2007, p. 9 
 
 
 The increased production and export performance of the Guyana rice industry during the 
1990s can be attributed to the deregulation of the industry and the privatization of its milling and 
export functions. Although those changes increased the competitiveness of the industry, costs 
remained relatively high and therefore affected the ability of Guyana to compete on the basis of 
price in the market for unprocessed or bulk rice. Government has therefore continued to improve 
competitiveness, with financial support from the EU grant facility, which is aimed at improving 
production and ensuring the viability of the industry.  
 
 Under the EU-CARIFORUM EPA rice exports from the Caribbean will enter the EU 
market quota free and tariff free from 2010. In the meantime, the region was granted a quota of 
187,000 tonnes for 2008 representing a 29 per cent increase over the quota of 145,000 tonnes for 
2007. The quota is to be increased to 250,000 tonnes for 2009. Rice exporters will also no longer 
have to pay the tariff of €65 per tonne on quota exports69. The EPA will therefore remove some 
of the negative effects of the EU rice regime especially in terms of market access. However, the 
issue of price decline will remain as the EU continues to reform its rice regime to comply with, 
among other things, WTO rules on subsidized exports. 
                                                     





VIII. Options for Caribbean rice producers 
 
 
A. Expand production of conventional product 
 
 With the quota free and duty free access for rice exports to the EU from 2010, both 
Guyana and Suriname would be able to export larger volumes of rice which could compensate 
for the reduced price on the EU market. In other words, the profitability of the rice industry in 
those countries would be based on volume sales. That means that costs of production would have 
to be kept low while maintaining quality standards. Guyana has already been gearing its industry 
towards increased production and reduced cost. The recent increase in global demand for rice has 
provided incentive for expanded production. Guyana increased its exports by 35 per cent (from 
183,000 tonnes in 2006 to 247,000 tonnes in 2007) and its earnings by 39 per cent (from US$49 
million in 2006 to US$68.3 million in 2007). 
 
 Whereas Guyana exports the bulk of unprocessed (husked) rice to the EU, it exports 
mainly processed rice (white rice and parboiled rice) to CARICOM countries free of tariff. 
Expansion of production in Suriname would also allow that country to export rice to the region 
since it is also a member State of CARICOM thus competing with Guyana for market share. 
Nevertheless, the increased demand for grain in world markets could result in a diversion of 
exports from CARICOM by the region’s rice producers in order to take advantage of higher 
prices in international markets.   
 
B. Develop high value rice products  
 
 The current high commodity prices on the world market are unlikely to be sustainable 
especially if they are partly due to speculation and therefore the windfall from such prices could 
be short lived. In any event focus on supplying the bulk commodity market should be shifted 
towards developing specialty rice and higher value rice products given the current trend in 
supplying high end and luxury markets. The top two exporters of rice to the EU are India and 
Thailand. India and Pakistan, which is the fourth largest exporter, export the premium Basmati 
rice whereas Thailand exports its specialty rice, Thai Jasmine White Rice. Thailand is the main 
exporter to the EU of its milled specialty rice. India and Pakistan export the husked Basmati rice 
to the EU. In 1995 for example, the EU imported regular husked rice from Guyana valued €3 
million. This increased by 7 per cent to €28 million in 2005. On the other hand, the EU imported 
husked Basmati rice from India valued €40 million in 1995 and that increased to €116 million in 
2005 – a 29 per cent increase. Jasmine rice imports from Thailand also increased by a 
comparable amount (25 per cent) over the same period70. 
 
 Guyana with its large rice industry should also consider developing valued added rice 
products such as cereals, pasta and flour given the high prices of wheat and other grains on the 
world market. This would contribute toward achieving a level of food security in the CARICOM 
region and could also address the concern of high food prices providing efficiencies can be 
achieved to contain high costs of production. The feasibility of embarking on such a project 
should be examined. 
                                                     








 Significant changes have so far occurred in the EU banana and sugar import regimes. 
Change has also been made to the EU rice import regime. These changes have been influenced 
by a number of factors. The change in the banana regime was brought about initially by the 
creation of the European Single Market and subsequently by the continuous challenges to the 
regime at the WTO by Latin American banana exporters who lost their free trade access to the 
German market as a consequence of the unification of the European market. The change in the 
sugar import regime was occasioned by the reform of the EU CAP which had been geared 
toward the development of self sufficiency in basic foods. The reform of the CAP was 
necessitated by surplus production, subsidized exports and as a result increased costs to the EU 
budget and the need to comply with WTO rules. 
 
 These changes have had the most significant impact on traditional banana exporters in the 
Caribbean, in particular the Windward Islands whose exports and earnings declined dramatically. 
The change in the sugar import regime has been more recent and hence its impact cannot yet be 
discerned but could only be predicted. Nevertheless, production and export of sugar in most 
CARICOM countries declined due largely to domestic factors. Restructuring plans have been 
pursued in the region in light of the proposed cut in the EU guaranteed price of sugar.  
 
 The initial reform of the rice regime was intended to remove a loophole that allowed 
Guyana to export most of its rice through the OCT of the EU. The imposition of rice quotas as 
well as a reduction in price adversely affected Guyana’s rice exports. The EU rice price was 
further reduced by as much as 50 per cent although import tariffs were also reduced. This 
reduction in price led to a significant decline in export earnings of both Guyana and Suriname. 
 
 The adverse effects of the changes in the EU import regimes should not necessarily be 
taken as a signal to diversify away from those industries that have been affected. The 
development of the banana industry in the Eastern Caribbean was the result of diversification out 
of sugar in most of the islands and that took place while the countries were still colonies of the 
United Kingdom and the export of tropical products was not yet developed. It is difficult for the 
smaller islands to successfully diversify into other agricultural products within the context of the 
present international trading system. It would also be difficult to increase their competitiveness 
vis-à-vis Latin American banana exporting countries on account of the nature of production of 
the crop in the Windward Islands, for example. 
 
 The banana is a significant small-farmer crop grown on hilly terrain and relatively poor 
soils. The small scale of production which contributes to high costs as well as exposure to natural 
disasters severely constrains the ability of the industry to compete with large banana plantations. 
The structure of production therefore contributed to the dependence of the Windward Islands on 
preferential access to the EU market. Producing banana for a niche market is therefore a more 
feasible option for the islands. The review of the Fairtrade option in this study indicates its 
benefits to small-scale producers. However, the viability of production for the Fairtrade market 
requires significant financial and other support which could be provided by governments in the 





economic cooperation between the Windward Islands and Martinique and Guadeloupe, islands 
that are an integral part of the EU.  
 
 Caribbean sugar producing countries realize the benefits of retaining a sugarcane industry 
even if sugar production proves to be unprofitable in light of the reduction in the price on the EU 
market. The sugarcane plant protects the soil and maintains its fertility. It is better able than the 
banana herb to withstand and survive natural disasters such as hurricanes and floods. In addition, 
it has several uses including power generation from the byproduct (bagasse) of sugar 
manufacturing. The sugar industry is the oldest industry in the Caribbean that sustained 
livelihoods before and even after diversification into other manufacturing and service industries. 
In recommendations regarding diversification out of sugar an important point is often overlooked 
and that is the cultural importance of the sugar industry despite its high cost of production in 
some countries. 
 
 It is the cultural significance (not overlooking its economic benefits) that has been 
important for maintaining the sugar industry in Barbados, for example. The sugarcane fields and 
the “Crop Over” festival that marks the end of the season are part of the culture of the island and 
feature in the attraction of the island to tourists. The proposed establishment of a living sugar 
museum attests to the association of sugar with the development of tourism in the island. 
Restructuring the sugar industry to serve the high end of the market also accords with the 
targeted high end of the tourism market.  
 
 Preserving the sugar industry as part of a viable agriculture sector also preserves the 
culture of the countries where cultivation of sugar cane and production of sugar is significant. 
The same is also true for the rice industry which contributes to the culture of the rice growing 
regions of Guyana. In Asian countries such as India and Thailand the rice industry plays a 
significant role in preserving the culture. Cultivation of rice is also beneficial to soils as it 
protects again erosion. While the cultural aspect of the industry is important the economic aspect 
cannot be ignored. That is true also for the sugar industry. Hence the need to move beyond the 
primary level of production into specialty and value added production. In the case of sugar, 
countries have already begun to move in this direction: Barbados into specialty sugar, Belize into 
Fairtrade sugar and Guyana into organic sugar. These initiatives need to be monitored and 
evaluated. 
 
 All of the products reviewed in this study can be exported as Fairtrade products in 
countries where they are produced by small-scale independent producers and firms that adhere to 
the Fairtrade standards. To improve the returns to producers and ensure the sustainability of 
Fairtrade, in-depth analysis needs to be done of each industry’s value chain including the 
Fairtrade chain. Such analysis was outside the scope of this study although the study did point to 
the need for adherence to social and environmental standards at the end of the value chain.  
 
 CARICOM countries need to monitor developments at the international level relating to 
their various export industries and foresee changes in policies of their trading partners. For 
example, the banana disputes arising from the EU regime of 1993 could have been predicted 
given the benefits that both Germany and the Latin American banana exporters enjoyed prior to 





their industries and the nature of trade in various markets when negotiating international trade 
agreements.  
 
 Emphasis should be placed on financing improvement in the industries reviewed in this 
study. Fairtrade returns are not sufficient to finance investment in significant upgrading of the 
industries and developing value added products. The EU support for the development of 
Fairtrade production and export is significant especially for small scale producers who do not 
have direct access to export markets. Financing value chain analyses of these industries, 
especially in terms of the Fairtrade chain, would be a valuable step in determining specific areas 
that could be supported by the EU within the context of the CARIFORUM-EU economic 
partnership agreement. 
 
 Although this study has argued for improving the traditional industries in order to sustain 
rural livelihoods, it also pointed to the need for diversification within industries to develop high 
value products as well as value-added products to satisfy both regional and extraregional 
markets. Sustaining the industries, in particular bananas and rice is important for addressing food 
security concerns in the CARICOM region. The region has traditionally produced food for 
export while satisfying most of its food needs from extraregional imports. The current state of 
high food prices both within and outside the region requires a holistic agricultural strategy that 
would address the need to maintain export earnings and at the same time satisfy most of the food 









Bureau, Jean-Christophe & Matthews, Alan (2005), “EU Agricultural Policy: What Developing Countries 
Need to Know”, Institute for International Integration Studies, Discussion Paper No.91, October 2005 
 
ECLAC (2005), “Restructuring Caribbean Industries to Meet the Challenge of Trade Liberalisation”, 
Limited LC/CAR/L.77, 21 December 2005 
 
Gillson, Hewitt, Adrian & Page, Sheila (2005), “Forthcoming Changes in the EU Banana/Sugar Markets: 
A Menu of Options for and Effective EU Transitional Package”, Report. Overseas Development Institute 
 
Goodison, Paul (2007), “The ACP Experience of Preference Erosion in the Banana and Sugar Sectors: 
Possible Policy Responses to Assist in Adjusting to Trade Changes”, International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Issue Paper No.7, May 2007 
 
Huan-Niemi, Ellen & Niemi, Jyrki (2003), “The Impact of Preferential, Regional and Multilateral Trade 
Agreements: A Case Study of the EU Sugar Regime”, European Network of Agricultural and Rural 
Policy Research Institute, Working Paper No.1, September 2003 
 
Laaksonen, K, Mäki-Fränti, P and Virolainen, M. (2006), “Mauritius and Jamaica as Case Studies of the 
Lomé Sugar Protocol”, Pellervo Economic Research Institute, Finland, Working Paper 06/21 
 
LMC International & Oxford Policy Management (2003), “Addressing the Impact of Preference Erosion 
in Sugar on Developing Countries”, Prepared for DFID, September 2003 
 
Mitchell, Donald (2005), “Sugar in the Caribbean: Adjusting to Eroding Preferences”, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3802, December 2005 
 
NERA Economic Consulting (2004), “Addressing the Impact of Preference Erosion in Bananas on 
Caribbean Countries”, A Report for DFID, August 2004 
 
Read, Robert (2001), “The Anatomy of the EU-US WTO Banana Trade Dispute”. The Estey Centre 
Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Vol.2, No.2 (2001) pp.257-282 
 
Roberts, Ivan & Gunning-Trant, Caroline (2007), “The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy: 
A stocktake of Reforms”, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) 
Research Report 07.13 
 
Sutton, Paul (1997), “The Banana Regime of the European Union, the Caribbean and Latin America”, 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.39, No.2 (Summer 1997), pp.5-36 
 
Thornhill, Stephen (2007), “Safeguarding the Benefits of the ACP-EU Sugar Protocol in the Context of 
the EPA Negotiations, 28/02/07 
 
 
 
 
